tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-64296053240445870472024-03-14T03:10:42.307-07:00Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.comBlogger338125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-56768518709962939872024-03-12T07:25:00.000-07:002024-03-12T07:40:38.092-07:00RSRM Welcomes Associate Milton Warren!<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh14kvS9yxX3tTB6SUhX0MFkfeLfZJ6K9HY4QW44RkpbtGag4oUlmlIQkfFC1agWj_KL6DCHsi-6X_uhCx_mWKAuHrxQGTOqX1P2kUj3my3BzJYIKbLi6xk0MnQZpfwjPs3FUCajMgMUTBxObafwkJAEVCT3s56PN1trja1kme11_pCaAuJhIehQk32aFk" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="640" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh14kvS9yxX3tTB6SUhX0MFkfeLfZJ6K9HY4QW44RkpbtGag4oUlmlIQkfFC1agWj_KL6DCHsi-6X_uhCx_mWKAuHrxQGTOqX1P2kUj3my3BzJYIKbLi6xk0MnQZpfwjPs3FUCajMgMUTBxObafwkJAEVCT3s56PN1trja1kme11_pCaAuJhIehQk32aFk" width="192" /></a></div><p></p><p>Milton P. Warren is a 2000 graduate of the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. While attending law school, Mr. warren completed the Access to Bail and Justice clinical law program providing access to pre-trial release and legal representation to indigent clients in Baltimore City pursuant to Maryland Rule 16 as a student-attorney. Mr. Warren also spent time interning at the States Attorney office located in Northumberland County, Virginia. </p><p>Immediately after graduating law school, Mr. Warren began working at a local Baltimore County law firm gaining experience in general practice civil litigation where he prosecuted auto torts, premises liability, estate probate and alternative dispute resolution cases. </p><p>Mr. Warren became a solo practitioner in 2003, building his private law firm as a general practitioner in addition to handling referral cases from other law firms in the State of Maryland and, recently, in North Carolina. </p><p>Outside of the office, Mr. Warren enjoys playing tennis, cooking, spending time with his wife Julie and family in Harford County, Maryland. </p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-59819089845260197392024-03-12T07:06:00.000-07:002024-03-12T07:07:18.634-07:00For Hearing Loss Claims, the Last Injurious Exposure Rule does not Apply to Insurers <p><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">For Hearing Loss Claims,
the Last Injurious Exposure Rule does not Apply to Insurers</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">Pennsylvania
Manufacturers Association v. William Cree, et. al.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">Claimant William Cree
filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission for binaural hearing
loss with a date of disablement of August 31, 2018, noting Prince George’s
County as the Employer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">Prince George’s County
impleaded Cree’s prior employers, The Town of Riverdale and the City of Laurel,
which they claimed also contributed to Claimant’s hearing loss.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The City of Laurel impleaded Pennsylvania
Manufacturers Association (“PMA”), which insured the City during the first half
of Claimant’s employment with the City of Laurel.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">The Workers’ Compensation
Commission held a hearing to determine liability for Claimant’s hearing
loss.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At that hearing, PMA argued that
it would not be considered the last insurer chronologically of the City, and
therefore should be relieved of any liability pursuant to the last injurious
exposure rule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Subsequently, the
Commission issued an Order finding that the last injurious exposure rule did
not apply to Claimant’s claim, and therefore also finding that all three of
Claimant’s employers were liable for Claimant’s hearing loss, as was the
insurer, PMA.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">PMA initiated an
on-the-record appeal in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
affirmed the Commission’s decision.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>PMA
then initiated an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Appellate Court of Maryland also affirmed
the Commission’s decision.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">In coming to their
decision, The Appellate Court of Maryland looked at the history of the law, and
the legislative intent for such laws.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>They noted that while the last injurious exposure rule applies to
employers and insurers for occupational diseases, it clearly does not apply to
employers in hearing loss cases.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
question, then, was whether the last injurious exposure rule applies to
insurers of employers in hearing loss cases.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">PMA put forth two
arguments at The Appellate Court of Maryland: (1) the statutes that deal with
hearing loss (Labor and Employment §9-651 and §9-652) do not use the term
“insurer” and therefore these provisions do not apply to insurers – only
employers; and (2) the statute that deals with the last injurious exposure rule
(Labor and Employment §9-502) has two separate paragraphs - <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>one applying to employer, and one applying to
insurers - therefore the last injurious exposure rule applies independently to
insurers, even when it does not apply to the employers that they insure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">The Appellate Court of
Maryland was not convinced by either of these arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Instead, noting that there was no indication
in the available legislative history that the General Assembly believed that a
claim for occupational hearing loss would be subject to the last injurious
exposure rule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Further, the last
injurious exposure rule directly contradicts the method for determining
liability for a claimant’s hearing loss, and accordingly to <i>Yox v. Tru-Rol
Co.</i>, 380 Md. 326 (2004), a general provision governing occupational
diseases is not controlling when it is inconsistent with the approach that the
General Assembly has specified for claims of occupational hearing loss.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">-<i> Ashley Bond, Associate</i></span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-76014750533836267552024-02-12T07:51:00.000-08:002024-02-12T07:51:44.623-08:00RSRM Welcomes Associate Audreina Blanding!<div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1xLqlhr__yTGHJ7WG33GjdF9ByzqfIQTx2ht90jwxM84YCdlnh_RCxTF1zuLJ4mO_1Jd_pkoee8AjQzp4FrvYPyl9bipJrXMAYHC6jUgDCpggTbItZPgYXmrHMVdHme-SzAo6DRxKWK_7LCh7r6ACfdCE57BTX2uad66DSyAu7D4rfDGLGUxl_Kz9zr8/s1280/Audreina%20headshot.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1280" data-original-width="1058" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1xLqlhr__yTGHJ7WG33GjdF9ByzqfIQTx2ht90jwxM84YCdlnh_RCxTF1zuLJ4mO_1Jd_pkoee8AjQzp4FrvYPyl9bipJrXMAYHC6jUgDCpggTbItZPgYXmrHMVdHme-SzAo6DRxKWK_7LCh7r6ACfdCE57BTX2uad66DSyAu7D4rfDGLGUxl_Kz9zr8/s320/Audreina%20headshot.jpg" width="265" /></a></div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Audreina J. Blanding graduated summa cum laude from the University of Baltimore School of Law in 2023 and graduated from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in 2016 with a B.A. in Economics. While attending law school, Audreina clerked for the Office of the Maryland Attorney General, Court and Judicial Affairs Division, as well as served as the 2022-23 Linda Kennedy Economic Justice Fellow with the Homeless Persons Representation Project ("HPRP"). </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ms. Blanding was also a competing member of the National Trial Competition Team and helped her team place 2nd at the 2022 Buffalo-Niagara Trial Competition. During her final semester of law school, Audreina had the unique opportunity to prepare a comprehensive assessment of North Korea's human rights obligations on behalf of the United Nations - a paper for which she was awarded 1st Place in the 2023 Center for International and Comparative Law Essay Competition. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Upon graduation, Ms. Blanding was inducted into the Heuisler Honor Society for graduating within the top 10% of her class. Immediately following law school, Audreina briefly served as the judicial law clerk for the Honorable Shirley M. Watts of the Maryland Supreme Court. Outside of the office, Ms. Blanding enjoys traveling, cooking, and trying new restaurants. </div>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-87926386163269194562024-01-25T10:29:00.000-08:002024-01-25T10:29:11.993-08:00<p><b> The Appellate Court of Maryland affirms dismissal of wrongful death suit holding that the Worker's Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for non-dependent tort actions.</b> </p><p><i>Summer Ledford v. Jenway Contracting, Inc.</i></p><p>Appellate Court of Maryland, filed. November 30, 2023
(Wright, J.)</p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span><span> </span>In
</span><i style="text-align: justify;">Ledford v. Jenway Contracting</i><span style="text-align: justify;">, the Appellate Court of Maryland
considered whether the Worker’s Compensation Act barred a non-dependent from
bringing a wrongful death tort action against the decedent’s employer.
Ultimately, the Appellate Court held that the Act barred the non-dependent’s
tort action and affirmed the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the wrongful death suit.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span><span> </span>The
case arose from the appellant’s late father’s tragic death that occurred while
he was working for the Appellee. It was undisputed that the father’s death
“arose out of and in the course of his employment.” The Appellant, the
decedent’s forty-seven-year-old daughter, had no right to benefits under the
Worker’s Compensation Act as she was not a dependent of her late father. She
filed a wrongful death negligence action against the appellee-employer in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The employer thereafter moved to dismiss
the action, contending that the Appellant had no viable <i>tort</i> action
against the employer because the Worker’s Compensation Act provided the
“exclusive” remedy for damages stemming from her decedent-father’s work-related
injury.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Circuit Court agreed and
dismissed the Appellant’s action for failure to state a claim.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span><span> </span>On
Appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland traced the history of the Worker’s
Compensation Act, enacted in 1914. Prior to the Worker’s Compensation Act, the
worker could sue the employer for negligence and the employer could likewise
assert defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Act’s passage reflected a
“compromise between employees’ rights to pursue common law and other statutory
damages for their injuries, and the burden to employers of having to provide
workers’ compensation benefits.” <i>See Hauch v. Connor</i>, 295 Md. 120, 127
(1983)). Under the Act, the employer is required to pay, regardless of fault.
In exchange, the employer is shielded from common law liability as the Act is
the exclusive remedy for injured employees and their dependents, also referred
to as the “exclusivity provision.” There are two exceptions to the exclusivity
provision: 1) where an employer fails to provide compensation in accordance
with the Act and 2) where an employer deliberately injures or kills a covered
employee. Neither exception applied to the circumstances before the <i>Ledford</i>
court.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span><span> </span>While
acknowledging that neither Maryland appellate court has encountered the precise
issue (whether the exclusivity provision applies to a non-dependent), the <i>Ledford</i>
court recognized that Maryland’s appellate courts have considered “whether a
wrongful death plaintiff is permitted to bring a wrongful death claim when a
covered employee is killed in the course of his or her employment.” The court
cited two examples, <i>Koche v. Cox</i> and <i>Austin v. Thrifty Diversified,
Inc.,</i> both standing for the proposition that, where an injury arises out of
or in the course of employment, the sole remedy is the Worker’s Compensation
Act. Applying these cases and the language of the Act to the Appellant’s
circumstances, the court concluded that the appellee-employer’s liability was
“exclusively within the worker’s compensation act” and further reasoned that
when a covered employee is injured or killed in the course of his or her
employment, the employer’s liability and any recovery resulting from that
liability is exclusive to the Act, <i>regardless of whether an otherwise proper
wrongful death plaintiff is entitled to benefits under the Act.” </i>(emphasis
added).</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>-Joseph Kavanaugh, Associate</i></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-37131089525166024112024-01-09T09:28:00.000-08:002024-01-09T09:29:11.122-08:00RSRM Welcomes Law Clerk Sean Delaney!<p><span style="text-align: justify;">Sean is a current 2L at the
University of Baltimore School of Law. There he is a staff editor of the
University of Baltimore</span><i style="text-align: justify;"> Law Review</i><span style="text-align: justify;">. His prior legal experience
includes an internship with the U.S. Army JAG office at Fort Detrick. He also
has experience serving as a legal writing fellow and law scholar for Civil
Procedure II and Property. Sean is a 2022 graduate of the University of Maryland,
where he majored in Information Science and Criminal Justice.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: left;">Welcome to the Team!</span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-12568173647649491052024-01-08T12:04:00.000-08:002024-01-08T12:04:03.719-08:00Congratulations to RSRM's 2024 Maryland Super Lawyers<p><b> <span style="background-color: white; color: #050505; font-size: 15px; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><span style="font-family: times;">Congratulations to the five RSRM attorneys who were selected to Maryland's 2024 Super Lawyers!</span></span></b></p><div class="x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs xtlvy1s x126k92a" style="background-color: white; color: #050505; font-size: 15px; margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;">Managing Partner <b>James Andersen</b> was selected as a 2024 Super Lawyer in the area of Personal Injury. Mr. Andersen has 30 years of litigation experience and has served as the Firm’s Managing Partner since 2014. He handles a variety of litigation matters including transportation, products liability, premises liability, construction litigation, and insurance coverage and defense. He <a style="color: #385898; cursor: pointer;" tabindex="-1"></a>has been selected as a Maryland Super Lawyer consistently since 2017.</span></div></div><div class="x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs xtlvy1s x126k92a" style="background-color: white; color: #050505; font-size: 15px; margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;">Partner <b>Paul Donoghue</b> was selected as a 2024 Super Lawyer in Workers’ Compensation. Mr. Donoghue has served as a Partner at RSRM since 1998 and handles workers’ compensation and general litigation/liability matters. He has been selected as a Maryland Super Lawyer in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023.</span></div></div><div class="x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs xtlvy1s x126k92a" style="background-color: white; color: #050505; font-size: 15px; margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;">Partner <b>Tara Barnes</b> was selected as a 2024 Super Lawyer in Civil Defense Litigation. Ms. Barnes has served as a Partner at RSRM since 2016 and works on premises liability, products liability, construction litigation, and insurance coverage and defense matters. She has been selected as a Maryland Rising Star Attorney from 2015 through 2018, and a Maryland Super Lawyer in 2023 and 2024.</span></div></div><div class="x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs xtlvy1s x126k92a" style="background-color: white; color: #050505; font-size: 15px; margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;">Partner <b>Benjamin Beasley</b> was selected as a 2024 Rising Star in Civil Defense Litigation. Mr. Beasley has served as a Partner at RSRM since 2022 and works on premises liability, products liability, and insurance coverage and defense matters. He has been named as a Maryland Rising Star Attorney consistently since 2022.</span></div></div><div class="x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs xtlvy1s x126k92a" style="background-color: white; color: #050505; font-size: 15px; margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;">Associate <b>Ashley Bond </b>was selected as a 2024 Rising Star in Civil Defense Litigation. Mrs. Bond will be an eighth-year associate in 2024 and works on insurance coverage and defense, construction litigation, appellate cases, and workers’ compensation matters. She has been named as a Maryland Rising Star Attorney consistently since 2021.</span></div></div><div class="x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs xtlvy1s x126k92a" style="background-color: white; color: #050505; font-size: 15px; margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word; white-space-collapse: preserve;"><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;">Each year, approximately five percent (5%) of Maryland attorneys are selected as "Super Lawyers" and two-and-a-half percent (2.5%) are selected as "Rising Stars.”</span></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family: times;"><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi3V3DZqCYj8wbYwXCxSZDjvZTr1pUXon_-ITDY22E9iL2vUMWmErxHD2_xsv9vwqt2j_JB_eLRM3e_sqo5HRa6bKhYUrh2zTzV_yJvQDRK8MxRAij0E_7ko1jnkt_3UKXpPKhRnbxygNu9zgFZJkEe0tRwTmYzjXAt4Z_KNCB6sz2zZmqK8UUzC5vvyXk" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="1280" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi3V3DZqCYj8wbYwXCxSZDjvZTr1pUXon_-ITDY22E9iL2vUMWmErxHD2_xsv9vwqt2j_JB_eLRM3e_sqo5HRa6bKhYUrh2zTzV_yJvQDRK8MxRAij0E_7ko1jnkt_3UKXpPKhRnbxygNu9zgFZJkEe0tRwTmYzjXAt4Z_KNCB6sz2zZmqK8UUzC5vvyXk" width="320" /></a></div></span></div></div>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-30645767605248585572023-08-18T12:11:00.000-07:002023-08-18T12:11:02.553-07:00The Supreme Court of Maryland holds that an umbrella policy clause excluding claims against named insureds by members of the same household is enforceable.<p> <i style="text-align: justify;">Pedro Steven Buarque de
Macedo, et al. v. The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut</i><span style="text-align: justify;">
480 Md. 200 (2022)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">This case arose
from a catastrophic motor vehicle accident involving Michael Buarque de Macedo,
his wife Alessandra, and their three children. The Buarque de Macedo family was
driving home from a high school play when their vehicle was struck by a vehicle
driving 115 mph. Only one child survived but sustained permanent injuries. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">Michael and
Alessandra Buarque, de Macedo had an automotive liability policy, with a
coverage limit of $500,000 and an umbrella policy, with a coverage limit of 2
million dollars. After the accident, the surviving child, the personal
representative of the estates of Alessandra and the deceased child (“the
Buarque de Macedos”) made policy limit demands on both policies. While the
insurer for the automobile liability policy paid the policy limits of $500,000,
the Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut (“AIC”), the insurer
for the umbrella policy, denied coverage for the accident. AIC denied coverage
because of an exclusion in the policy which stated it does not apply to “bodily
injury or personal injury to any person who is related by blood, marriage, or
adoption to an insured and who is a resident of the household of that person.”<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">This appeal came
before the Court after the Appellate Court of Maryland upheld the Circuit Court
of Montgomery County’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, where the
circuit court found that the household exclusion provision in the umbrella
policy was enforceable. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland, the central
issue centered on the Court’s interpretation of Md. Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Code Ann. § 5-806(b) which states: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 8.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">The right of action by a parent or the
estate of a parent against a child of the parent, or by a child or the estate
of a child against a parent of the child, for wrongful death, personal injury,
or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle, as defined
in Title 11 of the Transportation Article, may not be restricted by the
doctrine of parent-child immunity or by any insurance policy provisions, up to
the limits of motor vehicle liability coverage or uninsured motor vehicle
coverage.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">(Emphasis added). The Buarque de
Macedo family argued that the plain language of § 5-806(b) renders the umbrella
policy’s household exclusion void with respect to the surviving child, because
the umbrella policy included excess motor vehicle liability coverage.
Additionally, in Maryland, a provision in an insurance policy is unenforceable
if it conflicts with Maryland public policy. AIC argued that § 5-806(b), when
read with relevant provisions in the Insurance Article, makes it clear that the
General assembly intended for § 5-806(b) to be limited to the mandatory primary
layer auto coverage.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
Supreme Court of Maryland held that § 5-806(b) cannot be read in a vacuum and
must be read in conjunction with the relevant provisions in Title 19 of the
Insurance Article. The Court found that§ 5-806(b) referenced motor vehicle
liability coverage or uninsured motor vehicle coverage which strongly signaled
to the Court the General Assembly’s intent for § 5-806(b) to apply only to the
required primary liability coverage, and not to optional excess coverage
provided by an umbrella policy. The Court noted that the only reference to an
umbrella policy in Title 19 of the Insurance Article provides that an umbrella
policy may include the uninsured motorist coverage outlined in that section.
The Court also reaffirmed that an umbrella policy is not motor vehicle
liability insurance within the meaning of the relevant provisions of Title 19
of the Insurance Article. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the
Appellate Court of Maryland.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Fernando D. Kirkman, Associate</i></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-45233038541241780942023-08-11T07:42:00.000-07:002023-08-11T07:42:03.639-07:00RSRM Welcomes Associate Regan Leavitt!<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbsZgchauD6ahs_-DZ6Q9RQRTI0Irg47flOYz6rJjhkhX1BOcTcUk0OqEdoIiU4Bn2yJClTOBhR7fkB7bO935f9ovpKxN24MDi8bJ7unoeYBXnRitUtHFQ8eDAK8yl3RwoaMBKF01t0XDYQJ4WjhGoBInBf4cnL3G6Bp3dwKn1WWnFNDJpvqLJpjHMvl8/s2100/Regan%20Leavitt%20Blog%20Photo.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbsZgchauD6ahs_-DZ6Q9RQRTI0Irg47flOYz6rJjhkhX1BOcTcUk0OqEdoIiU4Bn2yJClTOBhR7fkB7bO935f9ovpKxN24MDi8bJ7unoeYBXnRitUtHFQ8eDAK8yl3RwoaMBKF01t0XDYQJ4WjhGoBInBf4cnL3G6Bp3dwKn1WWnFNDJpvqLJpjHMvl8/s320/Regan%20Leavitt%20Blog%20Photo.jpg" width="229" /></a></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #383731; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 13.0pt;">Regan Leavitt graduated magna cum laude from the University of
Baltimore School of Law in 2022 and graduated from the University of Michigan
in 2019.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While attending law school, Ms.
Leavitt served as a staff editor for the University of Baltimore Law Review and
interned with the Honorable Matthew J. Fader, Chief Judge of the Appellate
Court of Maryland.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ms. Leavitt also
clerked for a mid-sized firm in Baltimore in which she supported attorneys in
personal injury, medical malpractice and premises liability matters.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #383731; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 13.0pt;">Following law school, Ms. Leavitt clerked for the Honorable John
J. Nagle III in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #383731; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 13.0pt;">Outside of the office, Ms. Leavitt enjoys watching and playing
sports, traveling, spending time with friends and family, and playing with her
golden retriever, Goose. <o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-63277640279234394482023-07-13T13:36:00.000-07:002023-07-13T13:36:15.685-07:00Application of the Fireman’s Rule Under D.C. Law<p> <span> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;">A
plaintiff injured while performing professional rescue work may be barred from
recovery under most circumstances.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The
Professional Rescuer Doctrine, otherwise known as the Fireman’s Rule, generally
precludes recovery in tort for those whose business it is to save lives and
prevent injury to persons and property. It states that those engaged in rescue
work as part of their employment may not, as a matter of law, recover for
injuries sustained by them on the job, from those whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the injuries. <i>Gillespie v. Washington</i>, 395 A.2d 18,
20 (D.C. 1978).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Under
the professional rescuer doctrine, the professional rescuer is held to have
assumed the risks attending his work. "Those dangers which are inherent in
professional rescue activity, and therefore foreseeable, are willingly
submitted to by the professional rescuer when he accepts the position and the
remuneration inextricably connected therewith." <i>Id.; see also Young v.
Sherwin-Williams Co.</i>, 569 A.2d 1173 (D.C. 1990) (“The rationale underlying
the rule is that professional rescuers, such as police or firefighters, have
assumed the risks inherent in the profession for which they are compensated by
the public”); <i>Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc.</i>, 62 Md. App. 116, 123 n.1
(1985) (“Although called ‘the fireman's rule,’ the rule is without exception
applied to policemen as fully as it is to firemen. The rule is applied to bar
certain tort causes of action by firemen and policemen injured during the
course of their hazardous occupations.”). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals (“COA”) has addressed the scope and
applicability of the Professional Rescuer Doctrine in at least four reported
cases: <i>Gillespie v. Washington</i>, 395 A.2d 18, 20 (D.C. 1978); <i>Young v.
Sherwin-Williams Co.</i>, 569 A.2d 1173 (D.C. 1990); <i>Lee v. Luigi</i>, 696
A.2d 1371, 1373-74 (D.C. 1997); <i>Melton v. Crane Rental Co.</i>, 742 A.2d 875
(D.C. 1999). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">In
<i>Gillespie v. Washington</i>, 395 A.2d 18, 20 (D.C. 1978), the Plaintiff was
a member of the Metropolitan Police Department's Harbor Patrol who was
responding to the scene of a capsized boat. In attempting to upright the boat
and free any remaining passengers, the Plaintiff injured his back. Plaintiff
subsequently sued the Estate of the boat’s operator (who died in the accident).
The COA stated that the proper test for determining whether the doctrine
applies to bar recovery by a professional rescuer is "whether the hazard
ultimately responsible for causing the injuries is inherently within the ambit
of those dangers which are unique to and generally associated with the
particular rescue activity.” In <i>Gillespie</i>, the COA held that “[s]ince
[Plaintiff’s] injuries were sustained in the regular course of his professional
rescue responsibilities, [Plaintiff’s] may not recover in this case as a matter
of law.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">In
<a name="_Hlk136168619"><i>Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co.</i>, 569 A.2d 1173
(D.C. 1990</a>), a plaintiff firefighter sought to recover for permanent
injuries sustained after catching a man who fell off a bridge. The firefighter
argued that the professional rescuer doctrine does not apply to his case
because, when injured, he was acting outside the scope of his firefighting
duties. He based this argument on his testimony that at the time of the
accident, the plaintiff was a "pumper driver," whose primary duty was
to drive a piece of apparatus called the pumper and to connect the hoses to the
hydrant and to supply the necessary water to extinguish a fire. There was also
testimony that a firefighter is not expected to catch, either bare-handed or
with a net, a grown man falling from a height of fifty feet. The firefighter
essentially argued that the court should inquire into whether the particular
rescue operation at issue came within the firefighter's specific duties in the
company.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The
COA rejected the firefighter’s argument that rescue work was outside the scope
of his duties as a pumper driver. In explaining its reasoning, the Court stated
that: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">“[the
firefighter’s] injury was caused by [rescue victim’s] fall, a risk that, far
from being hidden, was the focus of all eyes on the scene. Nor can it be said
that someone hanging from a high place in life-threatening danger is a type of
hazard unknown to firefighters in the course of their work. Finally, trying to
save [the rescue victim’s] life was not some sort of extracurricular activity
for [the firefighter].”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">In
<i>Lee v. Luigi</i>, 696 A.2d 1371, 1373-74 (D.C. 1997), the plaintiff police
officer responded to an activated burglar alarm at a restaurant and filed suit
against the restaurant when he fell down some stairs and was injured. The
restaurant filed a motion for summary judgment and the lower court granted the
motion, holding that the claim was barred by the professional rescuer doctrine.
On appeal, the policeman argued that his claim was not barred because the
restaurant's negligence, which caused his injuries, was independent of his
police work. The COA affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the risk
involved was inherent and incidental to the policeman's work, and therefore,
his claim was barred by the professional rescuer doctrine. Further, the court
held that there was no extremely dangerous and concealed condition known to the
restaurant. The court noted that police should have reasonably expected that
property owners use portions of their premises to store items and that they may
not keep them clear for those not expected ordinarily to enter those areas.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">In
addressing the scope of Plaintiff’s rescue activity, the COA stated:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">[Plaintiff]
was performing his police responsibilities when he entered [Defendant’s]
premises to look for burglars or signs of burglary. The investigation
necessitated that he look in various areas of the restaurant, as he did. That
he had completed his examination of the door at the top of the stairs before he
fell does not show that his police business on the premises was at an end, as
he contends. To perform the investigation, he not only had to ascend the
stairs, but descend them as well. Nor does the fact that other officers arrived
on the scene change the purpose of [Plaintiff]’s presence in [Defendant’s]
premises at the time that he fell. [Plaintiff] seeks to draw too narrowly the
scope of the work incident to the performance of his "rescue"
activity.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Plaintiff argued that his
police responsibilities, and thus his rescue activity, were at an end by the
time of his injury (when he descended stairs of restaurant while investigating
burglary). The COA rejected this argument and held that, in light of case
precedent, the Plaintiff was still within the ambit of his police activities. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">This case is helpful in
the sense that the doctrine was applied to a situation where the “professional rescuer”
was not engaged in “rescue activity” in the traditional sense. Rather, the test
is:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">whether
the hazard ultimately responsible for causing the injury is inherently within
the ambit of those dangers which are unique to and generally associated with the
particular rescue activity.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The Plaintiff in <i>Luigi,
Inc.</i> actually argued that “he was not engaged in rescue activity at the
time he was injured” and that “he had completed his professional duties when he
fell as a result of [the restaurant owner’s] maintenance of a dangerous
condition on the stairway. However, the COA (in applying the above test) found
that the dangerous condition on the stairway was a foreseeable risk of the
officer’s “rescue activity” of searching the premises for a burglar. <i>See id.</i>
at 1375 (“While the doctrine may not preclude recovery for hidden or unknown
hazardous conditions, foreseeable risks are within the parameters of the
professional's work, and such risks will not support a claim for recovery.”). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The
most recent D.C. case to address the doctrine is <i>Melton v. Crane Rental Co.</i>,
742 A.2d 875 (D.C. 1999). In <i>Melton</i>, an EMT was transporting a pregnant
woman to the hospital via ambulance when he was permanently injured after a
truck crane struck the ambulance. The COA held for the first time that the
doctrine did not apply to bar the professional rescuer’s recovery because the
injury (i.e., 3<sup>rd</sup> party traffic accident while on the way to the
hospital) was not a risk associated with the reason for the rescuer’s presence
at the scene. It appears that the COA recognized an independent tort exception
to the general doctrine. The COA stated: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Although
EMT's regularly ride in emergency vehicles as part of their employment
obligations, the fact that the emergency vehicle might become involved in a
traffic accident is not a risk associated with the reason for the rescuer's
presence at the scene.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The COA went on to state
that the only activities the professional rescuer’s doctrine immunizes from
liability are “those negligent acts that occasioned [the professional
rescuer’s] presence at the scene.” Furthermore, application of the doctrine
requires some nexus between (1) the rescue, (2) the specific rescue activity,
and (3) the negligent act causing injury. <i>Id.</i> at 13.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> -<i>John Thompson, Associate</i></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Check back in to RSRM’s
blog to stay apprised of the latest legal developments in the Washington, D.C.
& Maryland area!<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-26894730550450424972023-06-15T13:20:00.000-07:002023-06-15T13:20:53.483-07:00Appellate Court of Maryland Holds Whether PA Common Law Marriage is Valid to Maintain a Wrongful Death Claim is a Matter for the Jury to Decide<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Thomas
Zadnik v. Richard F. Ambinder, M.D., et al.</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">, No. 803, Sept. Term, 2022.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Between October 2010 and April 2013,
Margaret Conway began seeing Dr. Richard Ambinder for colon cancer treatment. In
2017, Conway passed away. Subsequently, her partner, Thomas Zadnik, filed a
wrongful death complaint for medical negligence in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City against Ambinder and Johns Hopkins Hospital. In Maryland, such
action may only be brought by the decedent’s spouse, child, or parent. The
Circuit Court granted Ambinder’s motion to dismiss, and held that Zadnik did
not have standing to bring forth the suit since Zadnik was not married to
Conway.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Zadnik appealed this decision to the
Appellate Court of Maryland, claiming he and Conway entered a valid common law
marriage in Pennsylvania, in 1998 when Pennsylvania still recognized common law
marriages. A common law marriage is a legal marriage between two people who
have not obtained a marriage license or had the marriage solemnized by a
ceremony. The Circuit Court found that Conway and Zadnik had not sufficiently
established a common law marriage through clear and convincing evidence,
because no one witnessed their wedding and they failed to publicly hold
themselves out as married.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Writing for the Appellate Court, Judge
Donald Beachley first acknowledged the doctrine of comity, noting that Maryland
has never recognized common law marriage, but that Maryland must do so if it is
recognized in another state. Judge Beachley then looked to Pennsylvania law to determine
how parties may establish a rebuttable presumption of marriage through, inter
alia, constant cohabitation, since both parties cannot be present to testify
about the marriage’s existence. Under Pennsylvania law one spouse is allowed to
testify to a common law marriage.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As
such, Judge Beachley deems the question of valid marriage as a dispute reserved
for a jury, and as a genuine dispute of material fact.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The Court also considered the Dead Man’s
Statute, CJP § 9-116, which does not allow a surviving spouse to testify on
behalf of a statement made by their deceased spouse. The Court concluded that
if a jury found a valid marriage, then the Dead Man’s Statute could not bar
Zadnik’s claim. In finding this, Judge Beachley affirmed the inapplicability of
the Dead Man’s Statute to this wrongful death suit, as a wrongful death suit is
meant to create a benefit for the surviving spouse, not to recover for the
decedent’s loss or injury. Thus, a formerly legal style of Pennsylvania
marriage never procedurally recognized in Maryland could result in damages
against a Maryland defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">After delineating these parameters around
a common law marriage involving a wrongful death suit, the Appellate Court of
Maryland remanded this case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. Once
the jury decides on the validity of the marriage, the ramifications will ring
prescient for medical malpractice cases in Maryland, as Washington D.C. and
pre-2005 Pennsylvania recognize common law marriages, both of whom have
residents often litigating in Maryland courts.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"><i>Ali Mahdi, Summer Associate </i></span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-73583957441464768692023-06-05T13:27:00.000-07:002023-06-05T13:27:53.102-07:00RSRM Welcomes Summer Associates Patricia Ziff and Ali Mahdi!<p><span style="font-size: large;"> <span> </span><span> </span></span><span style="text-align: justify;">Patricia is a rising 3L at the University of
Baltimore School of Law. There she is an Associate Editor of the
University of Baltimore </span><i style="text-align: justify;">Law Forum</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> and member of the Honor
Board. Her prior legal experience includes working at the Office of Legal
Counsel for Baltimore City Schools and an internship with the Honorable Lori
Simpson of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. Prior to law
school, Patricia had a career as a high school English and art history teacher.
She holds degrees in art history, English, and education from the University of
Maryland and the Notre Dame of Maryland University.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span><span> </span>Ali is a
rising 3L at the University of Baltimore School of Law. There he is the
Editor-in-Chief of the University of Baltimore<i> Law Forum</i>. His prior
legal experience includes internships with the U.S. Department of Justice and
the Delaware Superior Court. Ali is a 2019 graduate of the University of
Delaware, where he majored in Economics and Political Science, minored in
Sustainable Infrastructure, and concentrated in Global Politics.</p>
<p style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: justify; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"><span style="color: black;"> Welcome to the
Team!<o:p></o:p></span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-44311772532270265482023-05-03T12:36:00.000-07:002023-05-03T12:36:04.077-07:00<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Appellate
Court of Maryland applies equitable contribution principles to preserve
non-settling insurers potential right to contribution against settling
insurers.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Selective Way Insurance Company<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, et. al. <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On February 2, 2023, the Appellate Court of Maryland
issued its opinion in <i>Selective Way Insurance Company v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance
Company, et. al.</i> The opinion primarily analyzed the doctrine of equitable
contribution, particularly as it pertains to liability insurers with a mutual
obligation to the same insured.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The original dispute arose from a Baltimore County
apartment complex construction project gone awry. In 2006, a subsequent
purchaser of the complex sued the general contractor, “Questar.” Questar was
insured with Nationwide and was an additional insured on various liability
policies held by Questar’s subcontractors. Nationwide defended Questar in the
underlying suit while also requesting defense and indemnification from the subcontractors’
insurers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The underlying suit against
Questar was settled in 2009, however, not before Questar incurred approximately
one million dollars in attorneys’ fees and other costs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Nationwide brought a declaratory judgment action in
Baltimore County Circuit Court against the various subcontractors and their
insurers alleging that they breached a contractual duty to defend Questar in
the underlying construction suit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Nationwide eventually reached settlement agreements with all but one of
the other insurers: Selective Way. The settlement agreements included
substantially the same provisions requiring the settling insurers to waive
claims for contribution or indemnity against the other insurers. In 2017,
Nationwide’s case against Selective Way (the sole non-settling insurer)
proceeded to a jury trial after which the jury determined that Nationwide
proved damages in the amount of: $994,719.54. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In March of 2020, Selective Way filed an action in
Baltimore County Circuit Court seeking contribution, restitution, and
subrogation from the various settling insurers. In June of 2021, the Circuit
Court disposed of Selective Way’s claims by dismissing and/or granting summary
judgement in favor of the defendant-insurers. The court ruled that Selective
Way failed to assert a cross claim against the settling insurers in the action
by Nationwide. Upon settlement with Nationwide, the court reasoned that there
was no longer a “common liability” between Selective Way and the settling
insurers and, absent a common liability, there was no right of contribution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On
Appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland overturned the ruling against Selective
Way on the contribution claims. The Appellate Court took issue with the trial
court’s reliance on Selective Way’s failure to assert cross claims against the
other insurers in the action by Nationwide, noting that cross claims are not
mandatory and need not be brought in an original action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Additionally, the Appellate Court analyzed
authority from other states to determine that insurer who pays “more than its
fair share” may have a right of contribution from another insurer that was
obligated to cover the same loss. The Appellate Court referenced <i>Maryland
Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co</i>., 218 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2000) for the
proposition that “a settlement agreement that absolves an insurer of its
contractual obligations to the insured does not extinguish the rights of other
insurers to receive equitable contribution from the settling insurer.” The Appellate
Court ultimately remanded the case back to the Circuit Court for further
action, particularly on the viability of Selective Way’s contribution claim
against the settling insurers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i>Joseph
Kavanagh, Associate</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-79332251574730881292023-04-14T12:33:00.000-07:002023-04-14T12:33:21.388-07:00<p> </p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Appellate Court of Maryland Affirms Summary Judgment Denying Negligence Claim Stemming from Gun Violence in
the Workplace</span></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">On
September 20, 2018, Snochia Moseley opened fire on several employees at a Rite
Aid Distribution Center in Aberdeen, Maryland, killing three and wounding three
more. Prior to her deadly attack, Moseley was employed by Abacus Corporation
and assigned to temporarily work in Rite Aid’s warehouse facility. The injured
employees, known as “The Mitchells,” were employed by Capstone Logistics who
contracted with Rite Aid to unload trucks at the facility. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">The
Mitchells filed suit against both Abacus Corporation and Rite Aid, alleging
that they suffered damages proximately caused by the companies’ negligent
failure to provide adequate security at the facility and negligent hiring and
supervision of Moseley. Rite Aid argued that the Mitchells’ tort claims were
barred because they were temporary employees under Rite Aid’s control and thus,
Rite Aid was entitled to workers’ compensation immunity under Section 9-509 of
the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act. Baltimore County Circuit Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Abacus and Rite Aid, finding that the Mitchells
failed to present evidence that would establish Abacus was negligent in hiring
Moseley or that Rite Aid should have foreseen the shooting such that adequate
security would have been provided. Additionally, the circuit court found that
the Mitchells were temporary employees of Rite Aid, meaning Rite Aid was
immunized from their tort claims. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">The
Mitchells appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which has since issued
an opinion affirming the circuit court’s judgment in part, and reversing the issue
of Rite Aid’s immunity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Earlier this
month, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s granting of Rite Aid’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that Rite Aid was not liable for the mass
shooting. The court reasoned that the Mitchells did not show that the mass
shooting could have been foreseen or that inadequate security was provided.
There was no evidence offered that would indicate Moseley posed a threat of
violence or that any events preceding the shooting would give rise to such a
violent attack. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the appellate court found that the
circuit court erred in finding that the Mitchells were temporary employees of
Rite Aid. In determining who the Mitchells were employed by, the court
considered which company had the power to select and hire the employee, the
payment of wages, the power to discharge, the power to control the employee’s
conduct, and whether the work was part of the regular business of the employer.
Control of the employees was the most persuasive factor, and because the drug
store chain did not directly supervise the Mitchells and the contracting
company Capstone was solely responsible for its own employees, the Mitchells
were not employees of Rite Aid. Although the Mitchells will not be receiving
settlements from Rite Aid, they will receive workers’ compensation benefits
through their employer Capstone. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">This
opinion serves two purposes, one for employers and one for employees. The court
made clear that this opinion was not to suggest that mass shootings are
unforeseeable as a matter of law such that employers may escape liability.
However, it sheds light on the standard of care surrounding a business owner’s
duty to protect invitees from gun violence. As for employees, this case will resolve
any confusion amongst employment, particularly when companies are
subcontracting with each other or third-parties are intertwined. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Faith
Zellman, Law Clerk<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-15947759303343800492023-03-21T05:52:00.000-07:002023-03-21T05:52:26.636-07:00RSRM Welcomes Associate Fernando Kirkman!<p></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhfTkPw1QpnT0pQCzUTEt1dYpyu7948Ob5C97tvhhgy1HlyJStN_HBDz7XHvFY1UOd6Hf-yuAZEpOHBdph5456zZ7nz8Uwdj9oSZncmT1tVW-eMTa7m-mSgkeSd9Uwg-qHhZMPrz6dr3b4ba7rHRUXaq2pJfcQJVFZKJ5Nfvn_yM5wzpXm6e5-mbjng/s2100/Fernando%20Blog%20Photo.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhfTkPw1QpnT0pQCzUTEt1dYpyu7948Ob5C97tvhhgy1HlyJStN_HBDz7XHvFY1UOd6Hf-yuAZEpOHBdph5456zZ7nz8Uwdj9oSZncmT1tVW-eMTa7m-mSgkeSd9Uwg-qHhZMPrz6dr3b4ba7rHRUXaq2pJfcQJVFZKJ5Nfvn_yM5wzpXm6e5-mbjng/s320/Fernando%20Blog%20Photo.jpg" width="229" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">Fernando
Kirkman graduated from the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law in 2017, and graduated from Towson University with a degree in Political
Science in 2011. While attending law school, Mr. Kirkman interned for the
Honorable Robert McDonald on the Maryland Court of Appeals, the NAACP, the
Maryland Office of the Attorney General, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
District of Maryland. Mr. Kirkman also was a member of the Moot Court Board and
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Team</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Immediately
following law school, Fernando was a judicial law clerk for the Honorable
Alexander Wright Judge on the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and the
Honorable Irene Berger, U.S. District Court Judge for the Southern District of
West Virginia.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Outside
of the office, Mr. Kirkman enjoys travel, spending time with family and
friends, and cheering on the Baltimore Ravens. Mr. Kirkman was born and raised
in Baltimore City and frequently volunteers in the community.<o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p><p></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-36281913501591410552023-02-01T14:00:00.002-08:002023-02-01T14:00:48.498-08:00Appellate Court of Maryland applies the recently adopted Daubert/Stevenson standard to overturn the exclusion of expert testimony<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><i>Parkway Neuroscience and Spine Institute, LLC v. Katz,
Absoch, Windesheim, Gershman & Freedman, P.A., et al</i>., No. 658,
September Term, 2021, Opinion by Adkins, J.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On
September 30, 2022, the Appellate Court of Maryland overturned the Howard County
Circuit Court’s decision to strike the testimony of a “lost profits” expert.
Parkway Neuroscience and Spine Institute (“PSNI”) brought a professional
malpractice suit against its prior accounting firm: Katz, Abosch, Windesheim,
Gershman & Freedman, P.A. (“Katz Abosch”). In essence, PNSI claimed to Katz
Abosch’s proposed compensation model plunged PNSI “deeply in debt,” causing
several members to leave the practice and further causing a significant loss in
earnings. PNSI retained a certified public accountant (CPA) as a damages expert
on the issue of lost profits.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
case was initiated in 2018, when Maryland still employed the <i>Frye-Reed</i>
standard to govern the admissibility of expert testimony. The <i>Frye-Reed</i>
standard largely considered whether an expert’s opinion was “generally
accepted” within the scientific community. <i>See Reed v. State</i>, 283 Md.
374, 381 (1978) (quoting <i>Frye v. U.S.</i>, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923)). While PNSI’s case was pending, the Supreme Court of Maryland abandoned <i>Frye-Reed</i>
as the controlling standard in favor of <i>Daubert</i>. <i>See Rochkind v.
Stevenson</i> (<i>Stevenson II</i>), 471 Md. 1, 35–36 (2020). The <i>Stevenson
II</i> court recognized that “<i>Daubert</i> . . . refocuses the attention away
from acceptance of a given methodology—although that is not totally removed
from the calculus—and centers on the reliability of the methodology used to
reach a particular result.” <i>Id</i>. at 31; <i>Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc</i>., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Based
on the substantive change in the in the law, Katz Abosch renewed their motion
to strike PSNI’s CPA expert. After a hearing, the trial granted the motion and excluded
the testimony of the CPA, taking issue with the CPA’s lack of experience in evaluating
the finances of medical practices, her methodology in using a “before and
after” method to calculate lost profits, her reliance on “subjective”
decisions, and her selection of 2015 as the year from which to base her
opinions. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On
appeal, the Appellate Court disapproved of the trial court’s decision to
exclude the CPA’s testimony based on her lack of experience with medical
practices such as PSNI. The appellate court considered it “an abuse of
discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial court does not deem
the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed expert
does not have the specialization that the court considers most appropriate.” <i>See
also</i> <i>Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co</i>., Inc., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The Appellate Court also found fault in the
trial court’s decision to <i>exclude</i> the testimony over what the trial
court considered an unreliable methodology.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Though the trial court questioned whether the expert’s chosen
methodology (the “before and after” method) was the <i>best</i> method to
calculate lost profits, this method was nevertheless an “indisputably
legitimate choice of methodology.”<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Ultimately,
the Appellate Court acknowledged that the issues raised with the expert’s
qualifications and methodology go to the weight of her testimony, not
necessarily its admissibility. The Appellate Court formally reversed the trial
court’s decision to exclude the lost profits expert and remanded the case to
the trial court. While this case is somewhat specific to CPA related experts,
it provides a helpful framework for practitioners applying Maryland’s new <i>Daubert/Stevenson</i>
standard to evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony.<o:p></o:p></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-57362713487287057532022-09-30T06:17:00.004-07:002022-09-30T06:17:34.124-07:00Maryland Court of Appeals Prevents an Injured Firefighter from Double Dipping <p><i style="text-align: center;"></i></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><i style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiyQ5yXq1NyMJ0bzpAXuTrywxlCBSiggIeNIMlYzKBnolvRciEapy8DHQr8xnU32Ls4gkcQwwLGn9jEEgeCgZaSYVpq8qAcrKrTiTAmFgUihtKUk_UVEGg9NrS0M6WIKXaT7swZXbTZ9bS7IceS8xyP_Jgi9LAzF1j8GhdOOVuijTk5bp2QEhQEdWMf" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1707" data-original-width="2560" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiyQ5yXq1NyMJ0bzpAXuTrywxlCBSiggIeNIMlYzKBnolvRciEapy8DHQr8xnU32Ls4gkcQwwLGn9jEEgeCgZaSYVpq8qAcrKrTiTAmFgUihtKUk_UVEGg9NrS0M6WIKXaT7swZXbTZ9bS7IceS8xyP_Jgi9LAzF1j8GhdOOVuijTk5bp2QEhQEdWMf=w398-h265" width="398" /></a></i></div><i style="text-align: center;"><br /></i><i style="text-align: center;"><br /></i><p></p><p><i style="text-align: center;">Spevak v.
Montgomery Cnty.</i><span style="text-align: center;">, 2022 Md. LEXIS 323.</span></p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span> </span><span> </span>R</o:p><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">ecently, the Maryland Court of
Appeals issued an unreported opinion that clarified the standard necessary to
apply the offset provision contained in </span><span style="font-variant-caps: small-caps; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; text-indent: 0.5in;">Md.
Code Ann., Lab. & Empl.</span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> § 9-610. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">The offset provision was designed to preclude
duplicative recovery for the same injury, essentially preventing double-dipping
into the same pot of comparable benefits. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">This provision does not however hinder a
claimant from receiving workers’ compensation benefits that are owed. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Instead, it is a means of regulating the terms
of compensation for injury.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span><span> </span>The case before the Court of
Appeals involved a firefighter who, after serving nearly three decades, went
into retirement due to a service-related back injury. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Upon his retirement, Mr. Spevak began
collecting $1,859.07 per week in service-connected total disability retirement
benefits. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Nine years into retirement,
Mr. Spevak suffered hearing loss related to his employment from exposure to
loud noises, such as fire engines, sirens, and alarms. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Due to this hearing loss, Mr. Spevak filed an
additional workers’ compensation claim to which the County objected. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">The County argued that Mr. Spevak’s
compensation for his hearing loss should be offset because he was already
receiving service-connected total disability retirement benefits due to his
back injury, which compensated him for wage loss. The County further noted that
a failure to apply the offset would result in duplicative recovery for the same
loss and Mr. Spevak would collect more than the maximum compensation available. Such compensation would be contrary to the legislative intent and workers’
compensation law. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Mr. Spevak countered
arguing that prior case law identifies a “same injury” test, and if applied,
compensation for hearing loss should not be offset because the back injury
arose nine years prior to the occupational hearing loss. If the “same injury”
test would not be satisfied, then Mr. Spevak’s compensation would not be
subject to any offset. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span><span> </span>The sole issue, in this case, was
whether Mr. Spevak’s benefits were “similar benefits” under LE § 9-610. To
address this question, the Court looked to the plain language of LE § 9-610(a)
and prior case law and concluded that the “same injury” standard is the proper
test to identify whether benefits are subject to an offset under LE § 9-610. The
Court ultimately held for the County, stating that the benefits Mr. Spevak was
receiving for his back injury fully compensate him for </span><i style="text-indent: 0.5in;">all </i><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">injuries
related to his service as a firefighter. Other service-connected benefits would
therefore be duplicative under the workers’ compensation system.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span><span> </span>Following this case, it becomes
apparent that in the event an individual suffers more than one occupational
injury, benefits may be “similar” and subject to the offset even if injuries
develop on different body parts and/or there is a significant gap of time from
which the injuries developed. The focus and application of the provision
appear to fall on the type of benefit received, rather than the type of
injuries suffered.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> -- <i>Faith Zellman, Law Clerk</i><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-73664495921959680392022-09-23T07:07:00.002-07:002022-09-23T07:07:25.055-07:00Maryland’s Intermediate Appellate Court Expands Scope of Personal Safety Exception<p style="text-align: center;"> <a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEixd-FXSFWSuldFaY03r_DV0DW0bAY6tZYIt0QKcvHS3bHR6_GSkALeLtSN08uxMA6BxYQUeS_Jm7iJZobTYlXek1vWeOEfEt7gJAsphI_BzdoTVNwCJ2eQ-RM2HnF1dGct9U71foDRxzJ-3iS4X3ZqEO7KP-YOFn_P2mqYyYMGlZsERUYB9m5oDNtw" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img alt="" data-original-height="200" data-original-width="200" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEixd-FXSFWSuldFaY03r_DV0DW0bAY6tZYIt0QKcvHS3bHR6_GSkALeLtSN08uxMA6BxYQUeS_Jm7iJZobTYlXek1vWeOEfEt7gJAsphI_BzdoTVNwCJ2eQ-RM2HnF1dGct9U71foDRxzJ-3iS4X3ZqEO7KP-YOFn_P2mqYyYMGlZsERUYB9m5oDNtw" width="240" /></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"></span></i></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><i><br /></i></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">David P. Bogert, et al. v. Thomas A.
Thompson, Jr., et al.</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">, No. 1171, Sept. Term, 2021.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>Under most circumstances,
a plaintiff cannot recover for pain and suffering when the damage caused by a
defendant’s negligence is limited to property only. A person seeking to recover
for emotional pain in tort usually must also show an accompanying bodily
injury. However, in a recent case Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals (“COSA”)
expanded the scope of one exception to this general rule. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>At issue in <i>Bogert v.
Thompson</i> was the application of the personal safety exception. Under this
rule, there may be recovery when the defendant’s negligence causes property
damage that results in emotional injuries that are due to the plaintiff’s
reasonable fear for the safety of himself or for the members of his family. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>The facts of the case are
as follows: On September 22, 2019, during the early morning hours Thomas A.
Thompson, Jr. crashed his truck into the house where David P. Bogert and his
family resided. Mr. Thompson was driving under the influence of alcohol, lost
control of his truck, and crashed it through the Bogerts’ garage. Directly
above the garage were the bedrooms of Mr. Bogert’s minor children. At the time,
everyone was asleep but were immediately awakened by the sound of the truck’s
impact. The noise caused Mr. Bogert to experience a flashback to an incident in
2005 while he was serving in Iraq. As a result, Mr. Bogert immediately believed
his house was under attack and he rushed to his children’s bedrooms. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>Counsel for the
Defendant, Mr. Thompson, moved for summary judgment and argued that, since the
only damage caused by the Defendant was to the Bogerts’ property (which
occurred while the Bogerts were sleeping), there could be no recovery for
emotional injuries. To support this position, the defense distinguished the
current case with the facts of <i>Bowman v. Williams</i>, 164 Md. 397 (1933), which
allowed the plaintiff to recover for mental injuries after he witnessed a truck
collide into the side of his house nearby his children’s bedroom. In <i>Bowman</i>,
the plaintiff actually witnessed the negligent damage to his property while in
the current case the Bogerts did not. The circuit court agreed that <i>Bowman</i>
was distinguishable and granted summary judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>On appeal, counsel for
the Bogerts argued that the personal safety exception was applicable because
Mr. Bogert was placed in reasonable fear for the safety of his children due to
Mr. Thompson’s negligence, and this fear caused Mr. Bogert to incur measurable
emotional injuries. In response, counsel for the Defendant argued that the
cases applying the personal safety exception all involve situations where the
plaintiff witnessed the accident giving rise to their mental injury. As such,
observing the act of negligence is necessary before the exception will apply. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>In rejecting this
contention, the COSA stated that a tortious act damaging a plaintiff’s property
and causes what sounds like a loud explosion would likely cause a plaintiff to
be just as afraid for his safety and the safety of his family if he hears the
explosion, but does not see what caused it, as a plaintiff who sees the cause
by witnessing the negligent act unfold. Therefore, when applying the personal
safety exception the plaintiff need not witness the accident so long as (1) he
was aware of it immediately after the accident occurred, and (2) that awareness
caused the plaintiff to reasonably fear for his own safety or the safety of his
family members. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span> </o:p></span><i style="background-color: #f8f8f8; color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", Times, FreeSerif, serif; font-size: 15.84px;">-- John Thompson, Associate</i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-86648697757778034992022-08-15T08:07:00.005-07:002022-08-30T05:29:09.929-07:00RSRM Congratulates its Attorneys on their Maryland State Bar Association Appointments!<p> </p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhaQcC29Orr4zuZU2tfkqO_30ykFOnTNxBsy1MIE4eN56g-LbbSA4Q7lhLytvrT8Zac7Bf-uX-SHtWxcNspj0sw7QSK76otgyyQDSIvU_M2Z3epVTPZ70vkQF9btungepZJBIDkCxo4_a_FNtoIvJzKziFo3N2pLfeD-Sj0cP-qpoS8Ajn7ixypEhi4" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhaQcC29Orr4zuZU2tfkqO_30ykFOnTNxBsy1MIE4eN56g-LbbSA4Q7lhLytvrT8Zac7Bf-uX-SHtWxcNspj0sw7QSK76otgyyQDSIvU_M2Z3epVTPZ70vkQF9btungepZJBIDkCxo4_a_FNtoIvJzKziFo3N2pLfeD-Sj0cP-qpoS8Ajn7ixypEhi4" width="171" /></a></div><p class="MsoNormal"><b>Tara Barnes</b>, <i>Partner </i>– MSBA Judicial Appointments <span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span>Committee Co-Chair</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgDqqhT_kJM_0qAHfmmbLQ84xmV0-wkMUaZQdr3dhqWsSOhJjH_IkCoiuLyL--dDBjD8ZO6uStu_0A3J-b1jOZVRtpzWwY8BKKB75eTCbydTYcgI8Gnnf-YMFEamsOEKKFIGbjodpZcAe9dlZffaKnvKwXefmJZsf7MyMh4IUa0cVwaRqZGreLRsez-" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgDqqhT_kJM_0qAHfmmbLQ84xmV0-wkMUaZQdr3dhqWsSOhJjH_IkCoiuLyL--dDBjD8ZO6uStu_0A3J-b1jOZVRtpzWwY8BKKB75eTCbydTYcgI8Gnnf-YMFEamsOEKKFIGbjodpZcAe9dlZffaKnvKwXefmJZsf7MyMh4IUa0cVwaRqZGreLRsez-" width="171" /></a></div><b>John Thompson</b>, <i>Associate </i>– MSBA Young Lawyers Section Council <span> </span><span> <span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span></span>Wellness Committee Co-Chair<o:p></o:p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh0cZ3boYo0FP_ulF703qCnvPncR6PZyrQoSBWU8W3ZYxobY-gtQRlvegY-2PmGZhWjLgoQcgSurb9o5kqMZ_3jHl9iHl6B5vQkyW_Uw4X7Wzed1mnXGwKB2xa5gp9hgC--ksPO5Sc2foKw09ZXW4bJzSY0KoVXHVVOoupGlvNfYX6DXADvhLgwu_5J" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh0cZ3boYo0FP_ulF703qCnvPncR6PZyrQoSBWU8W3ZYxobY-gtQRlvegY-2PmGZhWjLgoQcgSurb9o5kqMZ_3jHl9iHl6B5vQkyW_Uw4X7Wzed1mnXGwKB2xa5gp9hgC--ksPO5Sc2foKw09ZXW4bJzSY0KoVXHVVOoupGlvNfYX6DXADvhLgwu_5J" width="171" /></a></div><b>Ashley Bond</b>, <i>Associate </i>– MSBA Young Lawyers Section <span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> <span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span></span>Council Wellness Committee Co-Chair<p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgALvO81IywSFA__PYtPzNcWp1nBXK_hVPTqQlSk7OQS7IEtuUmU3szz-X3UPfKLJGEIvrQFf2JgExLt3BxImkNdM5DCUhvIRL_MIYz-eVwxDs1i7Bzpa_BmfctoHy3A00QFRViM4UxwdKtPy5O6Asn0HKOIMJVyhJvqUgrHqLo038q-XLCSfjChwx0" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgALvO81IywSFA__PYtPzNcWp1nBXK_hVPTqQlSk7OQS7IEtuUmU3szz-X3UPfKLJGEIvrQFf2JgExLt3BxImkNdM5DCUhvIRL_MIYz-eVwxDs1i7Bzpa_BmfctoHy3A00QFRViM4UxwdKtPy5O6Asn0HKOIMJVyhJvqUgrHqLo038q-XLCSfjChwx0" width="171" /></a></div><b>Logan Hayes, </b><i>Associate</i><i> </i>- MSBA Young Lawyers Section Council <span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> <span> </span> </span>Harford / Cecil Circuit Representative<p></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-51388907182166760912022-08-15T06:36:00.006-07:002022-08-15T06:36:55.368-07:00The Court of Special Appeals Clarifies Subrogation Rights of Carriers Under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act<p><i style="text-align: center;"><span style="background: white; color: #212121; font-family: Times, serif;"></span></i></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><i style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg7Hwrc-E0003n5QWoWgDUMm7LTOKzwyEBmNhnI9Wpu6GV5mGySSR44hZrgDtCW4E4nrd-5Gy1v8_ENoBoBQUsolFVsxh6VgzYcDg_3OQpScWqoLmpRfeBeYS1fheDVkdS-gBdW3mNVFQQ0Iz8ofgB1QHWIxZMba7rtmBsYUCB-fChQ7mt0XvUtiqME" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1280" data-original-width="1920" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg7Hwrc-E0003n5QWoWgDUMm7LTOKzwyEBmNhnI9Wpu6GV5mGySSR44hZrgDtCW4E4nrd-5Gy1v8_ENoBoBQUsolFVsxh6VgzYcDg_3OQpScWqoLmpRfeBeYS1fheDVkdS-gBdW3mNVFQQ0Iz8ofgB1QHWIxZMba7rtmBsYUCB-fChQ7mt0XvUtiqME" width="320" /></a></i></div><i style="text-align: center;"><br /></i><i style="text-align: center;"><span style="background: white; color: #212121; font-family: Times, serif;"><br /></span></i><p></p><p><i style="text-align: center;"><span style="background: white; color: #212121; font-family: Times, serif;">Conley
v. Trumbull Ins. Co.</span></i><span style="background: white; color: #212121; font-family: Times, serif; text-align: center;">, No.
0081-2021 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jul. 18, 2022)</span></p><p><span style="color: #0e101a;"><span> </span>In a recent unreported opinion by the Court of Special Appeals, a three-judge panel confirmed that the Appellee did not waive their subrogation interest by failing to expressly reserve that right in the final settlement agreement between the parties. This case stemmed from an on-the-job injury that occurred due to the negligence of a third-party tortfeasor. Following the injury, the Appellant retained an attorney and filed a workers’ compensation claim against Appellee, the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier. Additionally, Appellants filed a “third-party claim” against the tortfeasor, an employee of a national bottling company. Appellants and Appellee reached an “Agreement of Final Compromise and Settlement” which concluded Appellants’ claim against Appellee. Appellants' claim against the Third Party was subsequently settled. </span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> </span>Appellee then sought reimbursement from Appellants’ third party settlement under Appellee’s right of subrogation under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (“MWCA”). However, Appellants refused to provide the proceeds of the third party settlement because they believed Appellee waived its right to subrogation by failing to preserve that right in the final settlement agreement between the parties. In turn, Appellee filed a complaint against Appellants in an attempt to enforce Appellee’s subrogation right under the statute. On July 17, 2020, the Circuit Court of Baltimore County granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding as a matter of law that Appellee’s statutory lien under the MWCA, survived the full and final settlement agreement. Appellants filed a notice of appeal. </span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span><span> </span></span>The main question on appeal was did the Circuit Court err in granting summary judgment of Appellee’s statutory subrogation claim against Appellant, where Appellee did not expressly reserve their statutory subrogation interest in the full and final settlement agreement between the parties? Appellants believed that Appellee had waived their right to the third party proceeds by failing to reserve their statutory right under the details of the full and final settlement. Appellee argued that their silence concerning their subrogation rights did not amount to a waiver of their statutory lien on any of Appellants’ recoveries from the third-party tortfeasor. Since the decision to grant summary judgment is purely legal, the case was reviewed </span><em style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">de novo</em><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">. </span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> </span>No case law in Maryland had determined whether an employer/insurer’s subrogation right may be extinguished by failing to reserve that interest in a settlement agreement. However, after analyzing the MWCA’s amended history, along with general provisions, this indicated to the court that before October 1, 2018, an employer/insurer’s subrogation interest was not waivable by agreement. The court held that at the time of this claim, an employer’s subrogation interest was not waivable by agreement under Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl. §9-104. As a result, Appellee did not waive its subrogation interest by failing to expressly reserve it in the final settlement agreement between the parties. This decision clarified workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogation rights against claimants in the state of Maryland. </span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> <span> </span> </span><span> </span><i style="background-color: #f8f8f8; font-family: "Times New Roman", Times, FreeSerif, serif; font-size: 15.84px;">-- Scott Mitchell, Law Clerk</i></span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-84434463101468952022-07-29T09:58:00.001-07:002022-07-29T09:58:04.612-07:00Cosa Makes Clear That “Definite Proof” In WCC Hernia Claims Refer To The Quality Of Evidence And Not A Heightened Standard Of Proof <p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgiSs5qC_vw5_ETA0b_iORvUla76vgsMCQn70iUCnCK1ByH1Wv717pSqadqCB3SGxFDc_dslvMbaVH9FKd8qdlXg_ye4HLO5o8_1n1jOYowDZTgdRZMFI1U3wxW1oW0D9vmFI-pIdpOM_xrlgyfbtcPdJjDkDXcG8zFjQqpCp90ip3WwZk_xkBQYP4t" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="326" data-original-width="489" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgiSs5qC_vw5_ETA0b_iORvUla76vgsMCQn70iUCnCK1ByH1Wv717pSqadqCB3SGxFDc_dslvMbaVH9FKd8qdlXg_ye4HLO5o8_1n1jOYowDZTgdRZMFI1U3wxW1oW0D9vmFI-pIdpOM_xrlgyfbtcPdJjDkDXcG8zFjQqpCp90ip3WwZk_xkBQYP4t" width="320" /></a></div><br /><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> </span>The Court of Special Appeals (“COSA”) recently issued a reported opinion discussing the “definite proof” requirement found in Section 9-504 of the Maryland Labor and Employment Article. Section 9-504 of the Maryland Labor and Employment Article requires an employer to provide compensation to a covered employee for a hernia arising in the course of employment if the employee provides “</span><em style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">definite proof</em><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">” that satisfies the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“WCC”) that: (1) the hernia did not exist before or as a result of injury or strain a preexisting hernia has become so aggravated, incarcerated, or strangulated that an immediate operation is needed, and (2) notwithstanding any other provision of the title about notice, the injury is reported to the employer within forty-five (45) days of the occurrence.</span><p></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> </span>This case arose in September 2019 when a UPS employee sustained a hernia injury while working in the course of his employment. </span>The employee notified UPS of the injury the following day, and over the following months, the employee met with doctors and eventually had surgery to repair the hernia in November 2019. In February 2020, a hearing was held before the WCC, after which the WCC found the employee sustained an accidental injury arising out of the course of employment, the disability of the employee’s hernia is the result of the accident injury, and the employee was temporarily totally disabled from September 2019 to January 2020. As a result, UPS and its insurer had to pay causally related medical expenses and weekly pay. UPS and the insurer subsequently appealed the WCC decision to the Circuit Court for Howard County, where an “on-the-record” hearing was held in August 2020. The circuit court affirmed the WCC decision. UPS and insurer thereafter appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, where they argued, among other things, that the WCC and circuit court erred in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to the “definite proof” requirement in § 9-504.</p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> </span>COSA began its analysis with the plain language of the statute. Finding that the statute does not expressly or implicitly equate “definite proof” with any standard of proof, it reasoned that if the Maryland Legislature had wanted a heightened standard, it would have done so expressly. COSA then proceeded into Maryland case law on the issue and found that the Court of Appeals never made reference to any new or stricter standard, but rather its analyses in the cases focused on the lack of certainty in the proof provided. Last, COSA looked to neighboring jurisdictions with similar statutes and found that, similar to Maryland, these jurisdiction’s case law never equated “definite proof” to a higher standard of proof. Based on its entire review, COSA held that the language of the statute is clear and that the term “definite proof” refers to the quality of evidence and does not constitute a standard of proof.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> </span>While this case makes clear there is no heightened standard similar to that of a clear and convincing standard, it should put practitioners on notice of the need to have clear and credible evidence that can sufficiently satisfy Section 9-504’s requirements.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> <span> </span>-</span>-</span><em style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">Bryan P. Cleary, Associate</em></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-30587885173629314242022-07-25T07:55:00.001-07:002022-07-25T07:55:12.472-07:00Congratulations to Associate Logan Hayes on her recent trial win in the District Court for Prince George’s County!<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgc8ZcYPZkV39CEb7PsLFKtDtSlZl8XASru-ZDQN09EIW83HQC7b--bBrBd84AW6lnkLPFy_zrWdkt1VKBjia0kauMKJbx09nIrShN2GVl4-hI12jWVvo6W3qMIU1ZlRbC0gqdH57fHJX9v64r9DvidIPL-frGB1A1PCfqzwNm3HDcCE4mG5CwzRkLR/s2100/Logan%20Pic.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgc8ZcYPZkV39CEb7PsLFKtDtSlZl8XASru-ZDQN09EIW83HQC7b--bBrBd84AW6lnkLPFy_zrWdkt1VKBjia0kauMKJbx09nIrShN2GVl4-hI12jWVvo6W3qMIU1ZlRbC0gqdH57fHJX9v64r9DvidIPL-frGB1A1PCfqzwNm3HDcCE4mG5CwzRkLR/s320/Logan%20Pic.jpg" width="229" /></a></div><p></p>Ms. Hayes successfully defended an aquarium tank company in
a product liability case. Plaintiff alleged that his 500-gallon aquarium tank
had developed a leak due to a product defect, resulting in damage to his home.
At trial, after Plaintiff rested his case, Ms. Hayes moved for judgment in
favor of her client. Using applicable case law and relevant statutes, she
argued that Plaintiff failed to prove his claims of breach of implied warranty
of merchantability, breach of implied warranty for fitness for a particular
purpose, and negligence. The court agreed, finding that Plaintiff had not met
his burden in proving any of his claims, and entered a judgment in Ms. Hayes’
client’s favor.<div><br /><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">Congratulations to Ms. Hayes on this outcome!</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p></div>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-13540148987274068142022-07-11T07:21:00.004-07:002022-07-11T07:21:30.924-07:00The Supreme Court’s Prescription for the United States: Implications of Ruan v. United States <p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhofm66I6ok84sZLeQ-ZdCfzly_f2Hm0al1TThawP34Ydqg9Qv2WyF9vhSoR9N4z0wdPM8VFg15m7xFCF_5V8t3d6snsy9alGafl-k1D_-fioZH-a5Gvg7d8eshB3DDKbRqoxrV893glBB-0rHHs268YnxYXv6JMayhCXvnW9pS7AytsHidDFe7Qh3n" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="576" data-original-width="1038" height="217" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhofm66I6ok84sZLeQ-ZdCfzly_f2Hm0al1TThawP34Ydqg9Qv2WyF9vhSoR9N4z0wdPM8VFg15m7xFCF_5V8t3d6snsy9alGafl-k1D_-fioZH-a5Gvg7d8eshB3DDKbRqoxrV893glBB-0rHHs268YnxYXv6JMayhCXvnW9pS7AytsHidDFe7Qh3n=w390-h217" width="390" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p> <span> </span><span> </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Amongst the recent release of
controversial opinions, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that opioid “pill
mill” doctors cannot be convicted under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) without
a finding of subjective </span><i style="text-indent: 0.5in;">mens rea</i><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">. The CSA makes it unlawful for any
person “knowingly or intentionally…to manufacture, distribute, or dispense…a
controlled substance.” Registered doctors, however, a permitted to dispense
controlled substances via prescription, so long as the prescription is “issued
for a legitimate medical purpose…acting in the usual course of his/her
professional practice.”</span></p><p><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span><span> </span>Petitioners Dr. Xiulu Ruan and Dr.
Shakeel Kahn were both individually indicted and convicted of violating 21
U.S.C. § 841, also known as the CSA. Dr. Ruan was accused of improperly issuing
more than 300,000 prescriptions for controlled substances over a four-year
period, being a top prescriber in the nation for a type of fentanyl, and linking
his prescribing practices to his own financial interests. On the
other hand, Dr. Kahn was accused of selling controlled substances in exchange for cash
without performing any physical or legitimate exam. While both physicians
appear to have violated the CSA, the Supreme Court was tasked with reviewing
the physician’s state of mind in their unlawful prescribing practices.</span></p><p><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span><span> </span>The government argued heavily for
an objective </span><i style="text-indent: 0.5in;">mens rea</i><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> standard, stating that the statute’s “knowingly or
intentionally” language contains an implicit “objectively reasonable good-faith
effort” or “object honest-effort standard.” The Court rejected this argument
and held that in order to convict a doctor for violating § 841, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant </span><i style="text-indent: 0.5in;">knew</i><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> that they
were acting in an unauthorized manner or intended to do so. Had the Court sided
with the government, a defendant’s criminal liability would turn on the mental
state of a hypothetical “reasonable” doctor, rather than on the mental state of
the actual defendant.</span></p><p><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span><span> </span>With this decision, pill mill
doctors are not off the hook, but rather, charged physicians face higher
scrutiny from jurors when brought to court. Considering the lengthy sentences
that follow a violation of the CSA, the clarification of the appropriate
standard is critical to the proper prosecution of such violations and
administration of justice. However, the objective hypothetical of a “reasonable”
person makes frequent appearances in criminal law. In cases where a defendant
is charged with involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, or assault, the
defendant’s criminal liability rests heavily on an objective standard that the
Supreme Court has now taken a step away from. The Supreme Court’s decision may
influence how defense attorneys argue their client’s </span><i style="text-indent: 0.5in;">mens rea</i><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> in crimes
where reasonableness is the standard. If these newly founded arguments succeed,
the stability of criminal definitions and statutory elements may be in
jeopardy. While all nine justices considered the policy reasons behind
implementing a subjective </span><i style="text-indent: 0.5in;">mens rea </i><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">standard, their limited focus to CSA
violations may prove disruptive to the entire criminal legal field. </span><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">-- <i>Faith Zellman, Law Clerk</i></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-90366289005759684802022-06-30T09:40:00.004-07:002022-06-30T09:42:19.350-07:00Congratulations to Partner Rod Barnes on his Recent Win! <p><br /></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiqTL5gY0BhCKuGsSkBSTtS7jRby-MBscUBnxWnXaCuZVjnX6KPVNzqdLkEDv_XM4wEAEEHLM95NL7sLKTh8pihPL5JU0v_HePVRf5iaUznd5ErqfwccfIAoSrSoe8RFeZ4n_lxR5B-caQiWypaO7k1R5ZNnugz1VWYTDXBlBLykFMJON2PwJYwklNq" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiqTL5gY0BhCKuGsSkBSTtS7jRby-MBscUBnxWnXaCuZVjnX6KPVNzqdLkEDv_XM4wEAEEHLM95NL7sLKTh8pihPL5JU0v_HePVRf5iaUznd5ErqfwccfIAoSrSoe8RFeZ4n_lxR5B-caQiWypaO7k1R5ZNnugz1VWYTDXBlBLykFMJON2PwJYwklNq" width="171" /></a></div></div><br /><p></p><p>A 70-year-old grandmother from Florida was in Maryland Christmas
shopping with her granddaughters two days before Christmas at a local shopping
mall. While still shopping with her
granddaughters, the store closed for the night.
As the grandmother and her granddaughters were leaving the store, she
claimed that the steel overhead security gate suddenly and without warning
dropped from the ceiling six feet overhead and struck her on the crown of her
head. The Grandmother filed suit against
the mall and the retail store claiming that the gate was defective and dangerous
to store patrons. She claimed to have
suffered a traumatic brain injury which left her with cognitive deficits and
persistent headaches. She also claimed
to have suffered cervical spine injuries which required her to receive numerous
nerve block injections and ultimately a cervical spine fusion. Plaintiff claimed medical expenses in excess
of $169,000.00 and pain and suffering in excess of $900,000.00.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At trial, Mr. Barnes successfully argued that the Plaintiff’s
medical expert was unqualified to testify about the fairness and reasonableness
of the Plaintiff’s medical bills, all of which were from out-of-state
healthcare providers. The Court agreed
that the Plaintiff’s expert who was a local Maryland physician did not
demonstrate sufficient familiarity or knowledge about the billing practices in
Florida or Texas to enable him to testify about their reasonableness. Thus, all the Plaintiff’s medical bills were
excluded from evidence. The Plaintiff
then proceeded with a reptilian theory of damages.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Mr. Barnes carefully cross-examined the septuagenarian about
her extensive medical problems that pre-existed the alleged Mall incident. He also highlighted her varying accounts of
how the incident happened that she shared with her dozens of healthcare providers
– including that she accidentally walked into the gate as it was partially
lowered at closing time. Plaintiff
called 5 additional witnesses, all of whom were family members. None of her witnesses saw the alleged
incident so there was minimal cross-examination.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">During his closing argument, Mr. Barnes highlighted the fact that the
Plaintiff never called an expert witness who testified that there was a problem
with the security gate. Plaintiff didn’t
describe the gate, didn’t introduce a picture of the gate, didn’t explain how
the gate worked, didn’t identify what part of the gate failed, and had no
evidence that this type of incident ever occurred before the subject incident,
or in the 5 years since.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The Jury deliberated for 3 hours before returning a unanimous
defense verdict.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Congratulations to Mr. Barnes on this outcome!</p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-26282206747439741342022-06-21T08:05:00.002-07:002022-06-30T09:42:32.564-07:00Congratulations to Partner Benjamin Beasley on his recent trial win in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City!<p><span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 11pt;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjDkLqiIKhe8RAGRAkNGdfqwzzHf8UzcOrlIpZHNtlQ6qkoFyiwsD8xNzORguR-7FxrGip6yZ0ow09_3URfEL9LKTjGKWRNKQVpDw8XCF9eE18ZwfQgLJ463dFnghTQ9uYEM7O3N4UDSRARIL2xI8V84TsOpk_yQtR9SXviMhUNbvK4Ss_qR7abSgSL" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="1500" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjDkLqiIKhe8RAGRAkNGdfqwzzHf8UzcOrlIpZHNtlQ6qkoFyiwsD8xNzORguR-7FxrGip6yZ0ow09_3URfEL9LKTjGKWRNKQVpDw8XCF9eE18ZwfQgLJ463dFnghTQ9uYEM7O3N4UDSRARIL2xI8V84TsOpk_yQtR9SXviMhUNbvK4Ss_qR7abSgSL" width="171" /></a></div><p><span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 11pt;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Mr. Beasley represented an individual who made a left turn on a yellow arrow turn signal and collided with an oncoming motorist’s vehicle that had a green light. Relying on provisions in the Transportation Article and applicable case law, Mr. Beasley argued that his client was not negligent as his client had the right to clear her passage across the intersection. The court agreed, finding Mr. Beasley’s client was not negligent and entering judgment in Mr. Beasley’s client’s favor.</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 11pt; margin: 0in; text-size-adjust: auto;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 11pt; margin: 0in; text-size-adjust: auto;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Congratulation to Mr. Beasley on this outcome!</span></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6429605324044587047.post-78819400961553316972022-06-21T08:01:00.002-07:002022-06-21T08:01:44.343-07:00The Workers’ Compensation Commission gained Authority to Order a Complete Reimbursement of all Independent Medical Examination No-Show Fees.<p><span> </span></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgDka228-sK7649tIavP_s537iEpxaEBIm3CqAMXB-9gA_mFKWdQGTTwVW-HZ-8PWe2soKdK5GDMtU_NskSOI2dFbxmJb4WjFi0Goe5zlPRoabYJiBIAuxRUdsq1TWgWWOMhwS8hfHgVqEZ6K7DGe1E1ce2gi3lpQgoqVSNKprtsfxE1s5KRDLvn-Kq" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2100" data-original-width="2100" height="273" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgDka228-sK7649tIavP_s537iEpxaEBIm3CqAMXB-9gA_mFKWdQGTTwVW-HZ-8PWe2soKdK5GDMtU_NskSOI2dFbxmJb4WjFi0Goe5zlPRoabYJiBIAuxRUdsq1TWgWWOMhwS8hfHgVqEZ6K7DGe1E1ce2gi3lpQgoqVSNKprtsfxE1s5KRDLvn-Kq=w273-h273" width="273" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><p></p><p><span> </span>COMAR 14.09.03.08B(6) was recently amended to allow the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (“WCC”) to order claimants to pay reasonable expenses and costs actually incurred with missed independent medical examinations (“IME”). . The prior regulation only permitted the Commission to award employer/insurers reimbursements up to $125.00 per missed IME. This is now a huge victory for employer/insurers, as the cost of missed IMEs were often far greater than $125.00. </p><p><span> </span>Initially, we hoped that with the ability to award larger sums for reimbursement of IME no-show fees, employers/insurers would suffer fewer financial losses, and claimants would be deterred from missing IME appointments. </p><p><span> </span>Unfortunately, since the passing of this revised regulation, the WCC has still often declined to award full reimbursement of IME no-show fees. Rather, the Commission relied on a trusted doctor to survey various medical practitioners throughout Maryland and to calculate an average no-show fee. According to this doctor, the average no-show fee in Maryland was approximately $350.00. Since this determination, the trend from the Commission is to award no more than $350.00 per missed appointment. Unfortunately, this amount is significantly less than many of the invoices received for IME no-show fees. </p><p><span> </span>Still, it is important to file issues for reimbursement of IME no-show fees, in order to ensure claimants understand the financial implications of missing medical appointments. In order to successfully prevail on issues for reimbursement of IME no-show fees, it is imperative that the employer/insurer’s attorney receive the following documents:</p><p><span> <span> </span></span>1. The letter sent to claimant and their attorney advising them of the independent medical<span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> <span> <span> </span><span> </span></span></span>examination appointment.</p><p><span> <span> </span></span>2. The invoice from the independent medical examination provider with the no-show fee.</p><p><span> <span> </span></span>3. The check issued by the employer/insurer for the costs of the no-show fee.</p><p><span> </span>It is vital that the letter sent to claimant and their attorney is sent to the correct addresses. For extra security, the letter should also be emailed to claimant’s attorney with a request for a read receipt. If claimant can prove that they did not receive notice of the IME, the employer/insurer is unlikely to receive reimbursement. Similarly, it is important that IMEs are scheduled well in advance, and that notice of the IME is provided to claimant as soon as possible, in order to allow time for the claimant to make any necessary arrangements to attend the appointment. </p><p><span> </span>If you have any questions on how to pursue issues for reimbursement of IME no-show fees, do not hesitate to contact RSRM’s Workers’ Compensation Department, consisting of Partner Paul Donoghue, Partner Alicyn Campbell, and Associate Ashley Bond.</p><p> <i> -- Ashley Bond, Associate</i></p>Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, L.L.C.http://www.blogger.com/profile/14530790841159146210noreply@blogger.com0