THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND HOLDS THAT THE PROPER JURY QUESTION DURING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A DISABILITY AWARD IS IF AN ACCIDENTAL INJURY OCCURRED, NOT IF THE CORRECT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMITTEE

 In the Matter of City of Hagerstown, et al., No. 2114, Sept. Term 2023. Opinion by Arthur, J.

                On October 2018, Paul Johnson began working for the City of Hagerstown (the “City”) as a building maintenance specialist. In the Fall of 2021, Mr. Johnson was assigned to perform renovations at an office building in Hagerstown, which included repairing and replacing water-damaged walls on the basement level of the building. During that same year or at the beginning of 2022, Mr. Johnson encountered a large area of black mold in one of the rooms, which had a “really nasty” odor, resembling the smell of a “dead body”. After exposure to this odor, Mr. Johnson experienced fatigue, dizziness, coughing, wheezing, and difficulty breathing, for which he sought medical treatment. Upon advice from his physician, Mr. Johnson stopped working in February of 2022, and filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“WCC”).

                Upon the presentation of evidence, including confirmation of mold in Mr. Johnson’s workplace, and testimony, including medical certainty that mold exposure had exacerbated, if not caused, Mr. Johnson’s illness, the WCC determined that Mr. Johnson sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on January 27, 2022. It was also determined that Mr. Johnson was temporarily totally disabled since the day following his injury. A rehearing requested by the City confirmed the decision, labelling Mr. Johnson’s injury both an “airway disease” and “pulmonary airways disease”. The City petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Washington County, challenging the award of temporary total disability benefits. Both parties requested a jury hearing on all issues.

                Prior to and during trial, additional medical testing and evidence led experts for both parties to conclude that Mr. Johnson was suffering from hypersensitivity pneumonitis as opposed to the previously diagnosed “airway disease” or “pulmonary airways disease”. However, the experts disagreed on whether hypersensitivity pneumonitis was a subsect of the previously diagnosed disease, or an entirely different disease. The City argued the latter, and moved for judgment in its favor, arguing that the jury should be required to decide the specific question of whether Mr. Johnson had an “accidental injury of pulmonary airways disease”, which could only be answered in the negative as all evidence had clearly established Mr. Johnson’s disease as hypersensitivity pneumonitis. The trial court denied the motion, stating the proper question for the jury would be “did the employee sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment”. Upon presentation to the jury, the WCC’s decision was affirmed, and the City filed a timely appeal leading to the instant decision.

                The City raised four issues on appeal, two of note. Specifically, the City argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment and in limiting the jury question to “whether an accidental injury occurred”. The City relied on similar reasoning from trial, focusing on the change in Mr. Johnson’s diagnosis, arguing that the jury should specifically be asked if Mr. Johnson suffered “pulmonary airways disease”, and that the answer to said question has to be in the negative due to the change in diagnosis. Because of the relation of these arguments, the Appellate Court can address them using the same logic.

                Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the WCC’s finding that Mr. Johnson developed “pulmonary airways disease” was not a finding as to any ultimate issue. That finding was an intermediate factual finding that supported the WCC’s conclusions on the ultimate issues. At the de novo trial, the jury’s role was not to decide whether it agreed with any or all of the intermediate factual findings stated in the Commission’s opinion. Rather, the jury’s role was to decide the “‘ultimate issues . . . , such as disability[] . . . [and] whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment[.]’” Bd. of Educ. for Montgomery County v. Spradlin, 161 Md. App. 155, 191 (2005)  (emphasis in original) (quoting Schiller v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 137 Md. 235, 244 (1920)).

                Due to this, the proper question for the jury, as advanced by the trial court, was “did the employee [Mr. Johnson] sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment”, as opposed to “did Mr. Johnson have accidental injury of pulmonary airways disease arising out of and in the course of employment”, as proposed by the City. Because of this, judgment for the City was properly denied.

    - Ty Schumacher, Law Clerk