In Burns v.
Bechtel Corp., 212 Md.App. 237, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that the section 5-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article (“Statute of Repose”) applies only to defendants who are in actual
possession or control of real property when an alleged injury occurs. The court further held that the exception to
repose in subsection (d)(2)(ii) of the Statute of Repose is inapplicable for
asbestos-related injuries caused after the installation, affixation, or
installation of asbestos products
The case
arose when Jean and Robert Burns sued Bechtel Corp. (“Bechtel”) in the
Baltimore City Circuit Court on November 5, 2009. Burns’ complaint alleged that during the 37
years that Mr. Burns worked for PEPCO, Bechtel was employed by PEPCO as a
general contractor and given “absolute control” over power station construction
projects that included asbestos insulation in the designs. Mr. Burns further alleged that he was
exposed to the asbestos insulation, causing his August 2009 mesothelioma
diagnosis.
The Circuit
Court granted Bechtel’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Burns’
claims were barred by the Statute of Repose providing repose for defendants
against certain claims from the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property. On appeal,
Burns raised two issues.
Burns first
argued that Bechtel was excluded from repose because Bechtel retained complete
and absolute possession over all aspects of the job sites in question, and was,
therefore, in actual possession and control of the construction properties. The Court of Special Appeals refuted this
contention for two reasons. First,
subsection (d)(2)(i) of the Statute of Repose implies that a proprietary
interest is required to impute liability.
Burns’ allegation that Bechtel merely controlled the project, and not
the premises, was insufficient to demonstrate a possessory or proprietary
interest in the properties. The court
further noted that the language of subsection (d)(2)(i) of the Statute of
Repose mirrors the language of the common law principle of strict premises liability
for abnormally dangerous activities.
Because common law strict premises liability extends only to owners and
occupiers of land, the court reasoned that the General Assembly did not intend
to extend liability. The court,
therefore, held that this exception to the Statute of Repose’s did not apply to
Bechtel.
Burns’ also
argued that the asbestos materials installed by Bechtel were not “improvements”
contemplated by subsection (a) of the Statute of Repose. The Court of Special Appeals found this argument
unpersuasive because of the enactment of subsection (d)(2)(ii) of the Statute
of Repose. As the court explained,
subsection (a) of the Statute of Repose provides a general shield from
liability for death or personal injury that occurs more than twenty years after
the defective and unsafe improvement to real property. Subsection (d)(2)(ii) was later added by the
legislature to provide an exception to remove this shield of liability for
personal injury or death caused by exposure to asbestos dust or fibers shed
prior to or during “the
affixation, application, or installation of the asbestos or the product that
contains asbestos to an improvement to real property.” Because Burns’ alleged injury did not occur
prior to or during the affixation, application, or installation of the asbestos
products, this exception was inapplicable to Bechtel. The court, therefore, concluded that the
protections of subsection
(a) of the Statute of Repose applied to Bechtel.
(a) of the Statute of Repose applied to Bechtel.
Because Burns’ complaint was filed
beyond the twenty-year statute of repose, the Court of Special Appeals found
that the claims were time-barred. The
trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Bechtel was, accordingly,
affirmed.