In
the Matter of Bernard Collins, No. 591, September Term
2018
On
February 13, 2012, Bernard Collins (“Collins”) filed a worker’s compensation
claim alleging that he had developed heart disease and hypertension caused by
his firefighting work for the Huntingtown Volunteer Fire Department
(“Huntingtown”). Collins claimed that as of May 6, 2011, when Huntingtown was
insured by Chesapeake Employers Insurance Company (“Chesapeake”), he became
disabled due to his occupational disease.
Huntington and Chesapeake contested the claim. Chesapeake interpleaded
Selective, which insured Huntingtown in 1998.
On March 19, 2014, the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the
Commission”) found that Collins sustained an occupational disease (heart
disease and hypertension) arising out of and in the course of his employment as
a firefighter, that his last injurious exposure was with Huntingtown, that he
was temporarily totally disabled as of May 6, 2011, for one day, and from July
7, 2011 through July 24, 2011, and that his average weekly wage was $152.50.
Huntingtown
and Chesapeake filed petitions for judicial review of the Commission’s decision
disputing compensability and the date of last injurious exposure. Collins filed
a cross-petition disputing the calculation of his average weekly wage. While the appeal was pending, the parties
settled the claim, and filed a stipulation of dismissal in the circuit
court. The case was remanded back to the
Commission.
The
settlement agreement between the parties contained the following language:
The
Claimant hereby accepts this Agreement and the aforesaid payment(s) in final
compromise and settlement of any and all Claims which the Claimant, his
personal representative, dependents, spouse and children or any other parties
who might become beneficiaries under the Workers’ Compensation Law, might now
or could hereafter have under the provision of the said Law, arising out of the
aforesaid injury or disablement or the disability resulting therefrom, and does
hereby, on behalf of himself and all of said other parties, release and forever
discharge the Employer [Huntingtown], Chesapeake and Selective, their personal
representative, heirs, successors and assigns, from all other claims of
whatsoever kind which might or could hereafter arise under the Law from the
said injury, disablement or disability.
Approximately
two years later, Collins died from a cardiac arrest secondary to his heart
disease and hypertension. Mrs. Collins
filed a “Dependent’s Claim for Death Benefits” with the Workers’ Compensation
Commission. She sought dependency benefits
and reimbursement for Collins’ funeral expenses.
The
Commission held a hearing to determine, amongst other issues, whether the
Settlement Agreement barred Mrs. Collins from receiving death benefits. The Commission found that the Settlement
Agreement barred Mrs. Collins’ right to survivorship/death benefits. Mrs. Collins appealed the matter to the
Circuit Court for Calvert County. After
a motions hearing, the circuit court agreed with the Commission’s findings, and
granted summary judgment in favor of Huntington and Chesapeake.
Again,
the matter was appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court determined that the parties’
Settlement Agreement did not bar Mrs. Collins from obtaining death benefits for
three (3) reasons.
First,
§9-722 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Annotated Code
states that after a claim has been filed by a covered employee or the
dependents of a covered employee, a worker or his dependents may enter
into an agreement for the final compromise and settlement of any current or
future claim under the act. Thus, §9-722
does not contemplate a covered worker settling and releasing his dependent’s
inchoate claim for death benefits within the settlement of his claim for
benefits to which he is entitled during his life.
Second,
§9-722(d) of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Annotated Code
provides that settlement agreements are binding only upon the parties to
it. Here, Mrs. Collins was not a party
to her husband’s workers’ compensation case, did not sign the Settlement
Agreement that includes the release, and there is no suggestion that she
participated in negotiating the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, the Agreement was not enforceable
against her.
Third,
even if Collins could have unilaterally released Mrs. Collins’ claim for death
benefits, which he could not, the language of the Settlement Agreement does not
evince a clear intention on his part to do so, as it does not specifically
mention Collins’ death resulting from Collins’ covered injury or any future
claim for death benefits under the act. Although the Settlement Agreement
seemed to release future claims that could “arise” from his occupational
disease, a claim for death benefits accrues and arises from a covered worker’s
death from the disease (or injury), not from the disease (or injury)
itself.
Employers/Insurers
should keep this case in mind when settling cases, especially ones in which claimants’ death is likely to be caused by a causally related
injury/disease. It is also important to
keep in mind that accidental injuries have a 7-year statute of limitations on
causally related deaths, while occupational diseases do not have a statute of
limitations. Understanding these principles should allow Employer/Insurers to
better understand their exposure for each claim.
-Ashley
Bond, Associate Attorney
