Tuesday, October 22, 2024

Supreme Court of Maryland Holds That Financial Advisor Exposed to Mold Cannot Recover Compensation for an Occupational Disease under Md. Code Ann., Labor & Employment § 9-502

In the Matter of Morgan Stanley and Co. Inc., et al.  No. 1554, September Term, 2022.  Filed: May 30, 2024.  Opinion by Graeff, J.

Henry Gundlach was employed as a financial advisor at Morgan Stanley since 2008.  During Mr. Gundlach’s period of employment with Morgan Stanley, his office was located in two places, i.e., what he testified/described as one located in Building ‘B’ (for 6.5 to 7 years) and Building ‘A’ (for an additional 3.5 years).  In 2012, Mr. Gundlach began to suffer respiratory  problems and a persistent cough.  Mr. Gundlach saw his physician that ordered x-rays in April 2014, which revealed “pulmonary infiltrates.”  Mr. Gundlach followed up with a pulmonologist who researched the cause of Mr. Gundlach’s respiratory problems/persistent cough.  The pulmonologist eventually suggested that exposure to mold might be the cause and a search of the claimant’s office confirmed the presence of mold.

On May 29, 2019, Mr. Gundlach filed two claims with the Worker's Compensation Commission; the first alleging he sustained an occupational disease and a second claim alleging he sustained an accidental injury arguing that he was exposed to mold in his workplace and consequently developed pneumonitis (inflammation of the lungs).  After a hearing, the Commission’s order found in favor of claimant ruling that Mr. Gundlach had sustained an occupational disease of pneumonitis arising out of and in the course of employment.[1]  The employer/insurer appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on the issue of whether Mr. Gundlach’s condition was related to his employment as a ‘financial advisor’ for Morgan Stanley.

At trial in the Circuit Court, counsel for the employer argued, inter alia, that ‘pneumonitis is not consistent with exposure that is attributable to his [Mr. Gundlach] type of employment as a financial advisor.  At trial, Mr. Gundlach testified that “as a financial advisor, the office was the base of operations.  It is where you are supervised."  Additionally, he testified that his office was where his desk, records and phone were located, and a lot of his job was spent conversing with clients on the telephone.  However, when Mr. Gundlach was asked “whether there was anything about his job, itself, the duties of a financial advisor, a senior vice president, a portfolio manager, that would cause him to have pneumonitis?”  Mr. Gundlach answered “no”.  At the close of all the evidence, the employer/insurer moved for judgment arguing that as a matter of law, Mr. Gundlach had not sustained an occupational disease that was compensable under the Maryland Workers Compensation Act, specifically 9-502(d)(1)(ii).  The jury found in favor of the claimant Mr. Gundlach.  The employer/insurer appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which reversed the ruling of the Circuit Court reasoning in agreement with the employer/insurer that “occupational diseases are very specifically limited and circumscribed.  They are a creature completely of statute. Compensation for an occupational disease is subject to LE §9-502(d), which is a limitation on liability, and an occupational disease that causes disability is compensable only if it is due to the nature of the employment or if manifestations of the disease are consistent with exposure to an agent attributable to the type of employment.”  Basically, there was nothing about Mr. Gundlach’s job as a financial advisor that was linked to biologic, chemical or physical agent, or, in this example, mold, even if his office as a financial advisor tested positive for the presence of mold.  "If there was mold in this specific job (office space), that has nothing to do with Mr. Gundlach’s type of employment."

The Appellate Court discussed examples of employees that suffered a disease that is due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist, i.e., degenerative meniscal tears qualified as an occupational disease as a matter of law because the occupation of a paramedic requires frequent kneeling and stress in the knee, and these hazards led to the development of degenerative knee conditions (Black and Decker Corp. V. Humbert, 189 Md. App. 171, 191 (2009).  Shoulder impingement syndrome was a compensable occupational disease because repeated overhead arm motions are a hazard inherent in the occupation of an electrician (see Davis v. Dyncorp, 336 Md. 226, 237 (1994).  Mental disease alleged to be the result of harassment from fellow employees was not an occupational disease because harassment by fellow employees is not a hazard within the nature of the employment of a computer data operator (see Lettering Unlimited v. Guy, 321 Md. 305, 308-12 (1990).

The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court holding that in order to obtain compensation for an occupational disease in a worker’s compensation case under Md. Code Ann., Labor & Employment §9-502(d)(1)(ii), the employee must prove exposure to a biological, chemical or physical agent that is a distinctive feature of the type of work performed, as opposed to  a specific condition at the employee’s particular workplace … exposure must be a recognized risk of employment, it is not enough that the ailment is caused by the specific place in which the claimant happens to work. (see Dando v. Binghamton Bd. Of Educ., 490 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (N.Y. App. Div.1985).

- Milton Warren, Of Counsel

[1] The Commission also issued an Order finding that Mr. Gundlach did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of his employment on the second claim.