Carolyn L. Greene v. Children’s National Medical Center, No. 21-CV-0354
Plaintiff Carolyn Greene slipped and fell while visiting her grandson at Children’s National Medical Center (“Children’s) and suffered severe and permanent injuries to her left upper extremity as a result of her fall. She brought suit against Children’s, alleging: (1) that she slipped in liquid residue left behind by a ride-on floor scrubbing machine operated by one of its custodians; and (2) that there were no warning signs or “wet-floor” cones in the vicinity to alert her of the wet floor. The hospital moved for summary judgment at the end of discovery, arguing that they were not on notice that the floor was wet where Greene slipped. The trial court granted Children’s motion for summary judgment reasoning that Greene's claim required speculation to show that Children's was on notice of the dangerous condition that led to her fall, i.e. that liquid was left behind by the use of a floor scrubbing machine. Greene timely appealed.
To
establish a claim for negligence in D.C., a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that
duty; and (3) the breach of duty proximately caused damage to the plaintiff. There was no dispute that Children’s owed
Greene a duty of care to protect against, and warn about, any hazards that it
knew about and/or had constructive notice of same.
However, if Children’s, via its employees, was responsible for creating
the dangerous condition that led to Greene’s injuries, that alone would put it
on constructive notice of the hazard. Therefore,
the primary concern for the Appellate Court was to decide whether, based on the
evidence presented in discovery, a reasonable jury could conclude that Greene
slipped and fell on water that was left behind by a Children’s employee, i.e.,
whether Children’s created the dangerous condition that led to her injury such
that Greene did not have to make an additional showing of notice.
Prior
to the incident, Greene arrived at the hospital to visit her grandson around 8:00
am and walked around the majority of the fourth floor without seeing any liquid
on the floor, wet floor signs, or scrubbing machines. Around 9:00 am, Greene decided to leave her
grandson’s room when she slipped and fell in the hallway between her grandson’s
room and the nurse’s station. As she attempted to get up, she saw that the
floor was wet behind her, with visible streaks of water both in front of and
behind her. After the fall, several
employees came to help her, including a custodian who began to mop up the floor
and stated, “where are the signs that should have been on the floor? I didn’t
see any signs.” As Greene was
transported to a nearby nurse’s station, she noticed another hospital custodian, Parker, driving a ride-on auto scrubbing machine in other areas of the fourth floor. Specifically, the machine left water on the
floor behind him, in the same streaks that were visible to Greene where she
fell moments before. Greene was unable
to ascertain whether the machine’s brushes were down but insisted that the
employee was cleaning the floor and leaving water on both sides of the hall
where it had been. The subject employee, Parker, was later asked by a manager
whether he was operating the machine in the specific area where Green fell, and
he denied it. In his deposition, Parker stated he was “dust mopping” and had
placed caution signs on the floor to alert others he was dust mopping. Further, he claimed that he “never got around
to actually scrubbing the floors with the machine that day” and that he would
not have done so before nine in the morning, as the sick children are usually sleeping.
Lastly, Parker denied knowing anything about Greene’s slip and fall until the
day after the incident; however, an email was presented establishing that Parker had spoken with a manager about Greene’s fall at or around
10:30 am the previous morning and that he claimed to have put up wet floor and/or caution signs. Greene presented expert testimony regarding commercial
cleaning systems and practices establishing that it was highly probable the
liquid she slipped on came from the scrubbing machine because it is “quite a
common occurrence when using that machine.” Further, Greene’s expert rejected
the notion that Greene might have slipped in some liquid spilled by a patron,
because there was liquid in a lot of areas, and it would not make logical sense
for there to be spills in other areas of the fourth floor.
Ultimately, the
Court held that Greene adduced sufficient evidence at trial for a reasonable jury
to conclude that Children’s, via its employees, created the dangerous condition
such that it was on constructive notice.
The Appellate Court was swayed by the following factors: (1) Greene saw
the substance she slipped on and could roughly describe it as “streaks of water”;
(2) Greene saw Parker on a nearby floor scrubber leaving similar water streaks
around him; (3) she presented expert testimony that the streaks of water she
fell on most likely came from a floor scrubber; (4) the email provided
corroboration from a nurse that Parker had used the floor scrubber on the floor
shortly before Greene’s fall; (5) another Children’s employee asked immediately
after the incident where the sings “that should have been on the floor” were;
and (6) Parker’s own testimony that he put wet floor signs in place after the
dust mopping.
Children’s
argued that the evidence presented was all circumstantial evidence and there
was no direct evidence that Greene either saw the machine brushes on the floor, or that anyone witnessed Parker even drive the floor scrubbing machine in the
subject area in the minutes before her fall. In short, although there was no
direct evidence that the scrubbing machine did not go by right where Greene
fell, the Court held that the circumstantial facts could allow the jury to justify
an inference that Greene slipped and fell on liquid negligently left behind by
Parker, without adequate warning signs, and that these negligent conditions caused
her injuries. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reverse the entry of summary
judgment in Children’s favor and remanded the case to proceed to trial.
Since “notice” is a fact-specific inquiry into every premises liability action, this holding provides further insight on what factors the Court finds relevant and what circumstantial evidence allows juries to make a reasonable inference of notice and/or control over a hazardous condition.
- Regan Leavitt, Associate
