In a recent
decision, the Court of Appeals clarified that immunities in the Good Samaritan
Act and the Fire and Rescue Act do not extend to commercial ambulance
companies. The case involved a minor, Bryson Murray, who was taken to Easton
Memorial Hospital suffering from congestion and troubled breathing. Because
Easton Memorial Hospital did not have the equipment to handle the child,
hospital officials decided to transfer him to the University of Maryland
Medical System (UMMS) in Baltimore. UMMS arranged for Phi Air Medical to carry
out the transport by helicopter.
While
in the helicopter, Bryson’s heart rate and oxygen blood level began to drop
because his airway allegedly became blocked by the endotracheal tube. The
transport team searched for a pediatric mask to deliver oxygen to the child,
but could not locate it. The pilot was forced to land the helicopter at the Bay
Bridge Airport to locate the mask. By the time the transportation team was able
to reintubate Bryson, he had suffered hypoxic brain injury, and as a result, is
blind, deaf, and mentally disabled. Bryson, by his mother, Karen Murray, filed
a complaint against TransCare alleging medical malpractice. The complaint
argued that the company was vicariously liable under the principle of
respondeat superior for the acts and omissions of a paramedic transport team
member employed by TransCare. TransCare moved for summary judgment. The Circuit
Court granted the motion, concluding that TransCare was immune under the Good
Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Act. The Murrays appealed and the Court
of Special Appeals reversed, holding that neither statute applied to a private,
for-profit ambulance company. TransCare petitioned the Court of Appeals for
certiorari, which was granted.
The Good Samaritan Act
provides immunity to a broad class of rescuers and medical providers for any
act or omission in giving assistance or medical care provided without fee or
other compensation, unless grossly negligent, (1) at the scene of an emergency,
(2) in transit to a medical facility, or (3) through communications with
personnel providing emergency assistance. TransCare argued that it had the same
immunities under the Act pursuant to CJ 5-603(b)(3) as a “volunteer fire
department or ambulance and rescue squad whose members have immunity.” The
Court addressed whether the language of CJ 5-603(b)(3) intended “volunteer” to
modify just “fire department” or both “fire department” and “ambulance and
rescue squad.” The Court concluded, under the plain text of the statute, the
legislative history, and the applicable case law, that “volunteer” did modify
“ambulance and rescue squad.” Therefore, TransCare, a private commercial
ambulance company, was not intended to be provided immunity under the Act. The
Court also dismissed TransCare’s argument that if its negligent employee was
immune under the Act, that TransCare could not be liable.
The Fire and Rescue Act
provides broad immunity from civil liability to members of fire and rescue
companies and to the companies themselves for any act or omission performed in
the course of their duties, unless the act or omission is willful or grossly
negligent. The Court held that the Fire and Rescue Act was only intended to
protect fire and rescue departments, but unlike the Good Samaritan Act was not
limited to “volunteers.” The court appreciated that a commercial ambulance
company may qualify as a “rescue company” in particular circumstances. The
court ruled, however, that TransCare had not demonstrated that it functioned as
a “rescue company” that has the broad immunity from liability provided by the
Fire and Rescue Act.
Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals decision that
TransCare was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of either statutory
immunity.
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