Friday, February 1, 2019

Maryland Court of Special Appeals Affirms Summary Judgment on Contributory Negligence


Michele Cooper v. David Good, et al., January 8, 2019 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland)

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals recently issued an unreported opinion in Michele Cooper v. David Good, et al., in which it upheld the trial court’s award of summary judgment in the Defendant’s favor.  The decision upheld the lower court’s determination that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and as a result, barred from recovery against the Defendant.

The underlying facts of this controversy arose when David Good (“Mr. Good”) was traveling in the right lane of Coastal Highway at a slow speed in preparation for making a right turn into a nearby restaurant.  Signage over the road indicated that the right lane was reserved for buses, bicycles, and cars making a right turn. Michele Cooper (“Ms. Cooper”), riding a bicycle, was traveling on the same road and in the same lane behind Mr. Good’s vehicle.  As she neared Mr. Good’s vehicle and noticed that it was “barely moving,” she passed his vehicle to his right—between his vehicle and the curb. As Ms. Cooper attempted to pass Mr. Good’s vehicle, Mr. Good made a right turn, resulting in a collision from which Ms. Cooper sustained injuries.

Ms. Cooper filed a negligence suit against Mr. Good.  Mr. Good filed a motion for summary judgment against Ms. Cooper, contending that the undisputed facts established that he was not negligent; rather, Ms. Cooper was contributorily negligent.  Although Ms. Cooper argued that there were material facts of dispute (namely, Mr. Good’s use of his turn signal and his speed), the trial court granted Mr. Good’s motion, noting that bicyclists are held to the same rules as other vehicles.

Ms. Cooper appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly assumed the function of the jury.  The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, affirming the trial court and holding that Ms. Cooper was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and that there were no genuine disputes of material fact as to Ms. Cooper’s own negligence.

Ms. Cooper argued that her maneuver of passing Mr. Good to the right was lawful because § 21-304(b) of the Transportation Article permits drivers of vehicles to overtake and pass to the right when it is safe to do so.  The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, pointing out that a full reading of the Statute suggests that passing and overtaking to the right is limited to circumstances when the overtaken vehicle is turning left, or when the roadway is wide enough for more than two lanes of vehicles.  Because those circumstances were not present in this case, the Court found that Ms. Cooper violated the Transportation Article.

The Court acknowledged that Ms. Cooper’s statutory violation alone was insufficient to find her contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  As such, the Court considered other undisputed facts that demonstrated Ms. Cooper’s contributory negligence.  Those undisputed facts included: (1) Ms. Cooper overtaking a slow-moving vehicle to the right in a lane designated for right-turning traffic only; (2) Ms. Cooper’s admission that she was aware that other vehicles in that lane could turn right; (3) there were numerous businesses with entrances along the right side of the roadway; and (4) Ms. Cooper attempting to pass in a narrow space between the passenger side of Mr. Good’s vehicle and the curb on the right side of the roadway.

Ms. Cooper further argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because there existed multiple disputes of material facts, some of which included: (1) whether Mr. Good used a turn signal; and (2) whether Mr. Good looked out for Ms. Cooper before turning.  The Court found that these facts were material to whether Mr. Good was negligent, but had no bearing on Ms. Cooper’s own negligence, which the Court held was properly decided.

It is important to remember that this unreported opinion from the Court of Special Appeals is not binding on lower courts.  However, it is a significant, but rare, example of Maryland courts’ willingness to enter and uphold summary judgment based upon a plaintiff’s contributory negligence.

-Benjamin Beasley, Associate Attorney

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