The Appellate Court of Maryland Clarifies that Violation of a Traffic Statute Does Not Establish Contributory Negligence without Evidence of Proximate Cause F PROXIMATE CAUSE.

     Michael A. Owens, Jr. v. Zachary Murdock, No. 0110, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Ripken, J.

In June 2023 in Washington County, Michael A. Owens (“Plaintiff”) was riding his bicycle westbound in the shoulder of an eastbound lane when Zachary Murdock (“Defendant”) was driving northbound, approached an intersection, and collided with Plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained injuries to his head and back as a result of the accident.

Plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court for Washington County, claiming his injuries were a direct result of Defendant’s negligence. In response, Defendant asserted contributory negligence and moved for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff then filed a countermotion for partial summary judgment. The Circuit Court held a hearing on the motions on March 11, 2025, where the court found that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent and granted Defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which conducted a de novo review of the case, and considered whether the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendant.

The Appellate Court began its analysis identifying the standard for summary judgment, noting that a trial court can only grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. On appeal the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The Court then considered whether Plaintiff bicycling on the incorrect side of the road constituted a prima facie case of negligence. To prove a prima facie case of negligence based on a statutory violation, the plaintiff must satisfy two steps: “1) present evidence that the defendant violated a statute designed to protect a specific class of persons that includes the plaintiff, and 2) present evidence that the violation of the statute proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.” (Walton v. Premier Soccer Club, Inc., 490 Md. 204, 218 (2024)).

Defendant argued, and the trial court agreed, that Plaintiff was riding the wrong way, which violated Transportation § 21-1205, and thus Plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Appellate Court did not dispute that Plaintiff’s conduct likely violated the statute. Instead, the Court focused on whether the violation actually caused the accident. The Court explained that Maryland law does not treat statutory violations as negligence per se, rather, a statutory violation is merely evidence of negligence and must still be shown to have proximately caused the injury at issue. In the Court’s view, the trial court improperly treated the plaintiff’s statutory violation as dispositive without actually analyzing causation.

According to Plaintiff, he saw the defendant’s vehicle stop, and slowed his bicycle, believing he could safely proceed before he turned. According to Defendant, he stopped, looked for traffic, and did not see Plaintiff before turning. The Court concluded that this conflicting testimony created a genuine dispute of causation. As a result, the issue could not be resolved as a matter of law. In reaching the decision, the Court relied on Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547 (2003), where the Maryland Supreme Court similarly held that a plaintiff’s violation of a traffic statute did not automatically establish contributory negligence because the causal connection between the violation and the injury remained disputed. The court reversed and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Washington County.

This decision emphasizes that statutory violation alone is not enough to establish contributory negligence. Defendants must also demonstrate that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury in order to bar the plaintiff’s recovery under a theory of contributory negligence.

    - Allison Comess, Law Clerk