Supreme Court of Maryland Holds that Inner Harbor Promenade Does Not Fall Within Purview of Maryland's Recreational Use Statute and the City Assumes Common Law Duties of Care to Individuals Using the Promenade
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Jamie Wallace, No. 12, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Gould, J.
On
June 19, 2018, Jamie Wallace was riding her bike home from work through the
promenade part of the Inner Harbor Park (the “Promenade”) when her bike became
lodged between the bricks and granite bulkhead running along the water’s edge,
causing her to fall and sustain injuries. Ms. Wallace brought suit against the
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the “City”) for claims of negligence,
stating that the City breached the duty owed to Ms. Wallace by negligently
causing, allowing to remain, and/or failing to warn her of the condition in the
Promenade of which the City had actual and/or constructive knowledge. On a
motion for summary judgment, and twice at trial, the City argued that they were
not liable as a matter of law, citing the “Maryland Recreational Use Statute,”
which essentially relieves an owner of land from civil liability if the land is
used for recreational and/or educational purposes. See generally Maryland Natural
Resources Code § 5-1104. The Court denied the City’s three (3) motions stating
that Ms. Wallace was commuting from work and not using the Promenade for
recreational purposes, thus the Recreational Use Statute did not apply. The City filed a timely appeal, and the
Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that
“[d]espite being located within the Inner Harbor Park, the [Promenade]
functions primarily as a public pedestrian walkway and shared bicycle path that
serves as a connector between different parties of the city, rather than as a
recreational facility.” See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wallace,
260 Md.App. 388 (2024). Subsequently, the City filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, which was granted.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court of Maryland was whether the Recreational Use Statute applied to the facts of the case. In short, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Recreational Use Statute “[d]oes not protect local governments from common law liability when the government has made property available for transportation purposes as part of its public infrastructure, even when a permitted use within that transportation infrastructure – such as biking – also constitutes a recreational activity.” Fundamentally, because the City enacted a Bicycle Master Plan in 2006, which was revised in 2015, to promote and facilitate bicycling as a form of transportation and recreation in Baltimore, the Promenade was part of the “integrated on-street and off-street bikeway network” that is a part of the City’s transportation system and for recreational purposes. Accordingly, the City established a right of access independent from any recreational invitation and, thus, assumed the corresponding common law duties associated with that right. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that an individual’s subjective purpose, i.e. for recreation or transportation, for entering the Promenade was relevant to the analysis of whether the Recreational Use Statute applied, as considering such intent would lead to “absurd” results and potentially open an avenue for the City to reduce its risk on all properties by simply opening them for recreational purposes. The City noted concerns that denying the statute’s protection would mean that it would never apply to any park with paths or walkways that are used for both recreational and transportation purposes. However, the Supreme Court cautioned that, here, the City was denied the statute’s protection because the City took affirmative measures to incorporate the Promenade into a transportation system that permits bicycling— not because the Promenade happens to serve both recreational and transportation purposes. Accordingly, future interpretation of the Recreational Use Statute will require fact-specific inquiries as to whether the land has been incorporated into specific usage which is within the government’s purview to maintain and/or control.
Judge Biran wrote a concurring opinion, stating that he agreed with the majority’s assertions that “a formal incorporation of the property into the transportation infrastructure is not the only way a local government could render the Recreational Use Statute inapplicable,” but believed that a two-part test should be enacted to resolve the range of cases where a defendant raises the Recreational Use Statute as a defense to liability for an injury that occurred on land the owner has dedicated for recreational use. This two-prong test focuses on whether the location was primarily intended for recreational activities and, if so, whether the plaintiff was on actual or constructive notice that the land was substantially used for non-recreational activity. Judge Biran proposed this test to account for the reality that some parks have both recreational and non-recreational areas, and because the General Assembly did not intend to confer immunity on a landowner for specific portions of the park that are not intended to be used for recreational purposes.
This opinion helps clarify the common-law duties imposed on the City for an area that many residents of Baltimore traverse.
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Regan Krueger, Associate

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